13 the provisions of these Judgments, other people would be in the paradoxical situation of being compelling to submit their cases before the Inter-American system. 44. That this Tribunal deems appropriate to repeat that what is ordered by the Court in its operative paragraphs of the Judgments provide, in fact, general guidelines, inasmuch as the origin of this form of reparation was the non-compliance by the State with Article 2 of the American Convention, by keeping in force those rules of the Penal Code once Guatemala ratified said treaty. This order of the Court binds all the state powers and organs.5 In particular, in the case of Fermín Ramírez, according to the terms of paragraphs 81 and 90 to 98 of the Judgment, the introduction in the penal text of the dangerousness of the agent as criteria for the typical classification of facts and the application of certain penalties, is incompatible with the principle of criminal lawfulness (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia) and, therefore, contrary to the Convention. In that way, the so ordered reparation establishes, on the one hand, the duty of state's organs in charge of administering penal justice to abstain from applying the part of Section 132 of the Guatemalan Penal Code as to the dangerousness of the agent to any prosecuted, accused or convicted person under this criminal type. On the other hand, it spring from there that the duty of the Guatemalan legislative branch as to the modification of this provision within a reasonable time, so as to guarantee the respect for the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia, eliminating the reference made to the dangerousness established in such provision. As to the case of Raxcacó Reyes, this Court has decided that Section 201 of the Guatemalan Penal Code is contrary to the American Convention and that the State, apart from modifying such rule under the terms of paragraph 132 of the Judgment, must abstain from applying it and refrain from executing the people who have been convicted of the crime classified in said section, as long as those reforms are not made. 45. That the Court underlines that those States that have ratified the Convention, in exercise of their sovereign authorities, have acquired the commitment to adapt their legislation and with that, ensure the application of the rules recognized by the state itself, by the state’s agents or organs. This state commitment becomes more evident when the Court itself points out in a specific case that certain rules of the domestic legislation violate the American Convention and, therefore, orders as a guarantee of non-repetition the adaptation of the domestic law. The opposite thing would be translated in a concerning suspension of the conventional rules that would be inconsistent with the effective enforcement of the human rights and the sovereign decision of the State to bind itself to comply with the rules of the Convention. 46. That, in such way, in order to ensure the useful effect of the provisions of the American Convention and its own effects, according to the obligations contained in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention, the Court urges the State to adopt the measures necessary to adapt its domestic rules and, in consequence, requests it that in the next report refers to the arguments exposed by the representatives (supra para. 40). * * * 5 See Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Competence, Supra note 2, para. 60; Case of Gómez Palomino v. Peru; Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, supra note 2; considering clause seven and Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru; Monitoring Compliance with Judgment. Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of July 12, 2007, Considering Clause six.