find expression in the universe of Law 22. This does not at all amount to a "cultural relativism", but rather to the recognition of the relevance of the cultural identity and diversity for the effectiveness of the juridical norms. 25. The adepts of the so-called "cultural relativism" seem to forget some unquestionable basic elements, namely: first, cultures are not static, they manifest themselves dynamically in the time, and have shown themselves open to the advances in the domain of human rights in the last decades 23; second, many human rights treaties have been ratified by States with the most diverse cultures; third, there are more recent treaties, - such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), - which, in their travaux préparatoires24, have taken in due account cultural diversity, and today enjoy a virtually universal acceptance25; fourth, cultural diversity has never been an obstacle to the formation of a universal nucleus of non-derogable fundamental rights, set forth in many human rights treaties; fifth, the Geneva Conventions on International Humanitarian Law also count on a virtually universal acceptance. 26. As if these elements were not sufficient, in our days cultural diversity has not refrained the contemporary tendency of criminalization of grave violations of human rights, nor the advances in the international criminal law, nor the provision for universal jurisdiction in some human rights treaties (such as the United Nations Convention against Torture (1984), among others), nor the universal struggle to put an end to the crimes against humanity. In fact, cultural diversity has not impeded, either, the creation, in our days, of a true international regime against torture, forced disappearances of persons, and summary, extra-legal and arbitrary executions26. 27. All this points to the prevalence of the safeguard of the non-derogable rights in any circumstances (in times of peace as well as of armed conflict). The normative and interpretative convergences between the International Law of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, acknowledged in the present Judgment in the Bámaca Velásquez case (pars. 205-207), contribute to place those non-derogable rights, - starting with the fundamental right to life itself, - definitively in the domain of jus cogens. 22 . It may be recalled that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had the occasion to take into account the modus vivendi and the cultural practices of the maroons in Suriname (the saramaca [cf.] custom), in its Judgment on reparations in the Aloeboetoe and Others case (of 10.09.1993). 23 . E.g., women's rights, in various parts of the. - Furthermore, no-one would dare to deny, for example, the right to cultural identity, which thus would have, that right itself, a universal dimension; cf. [Various Authors,] Law and Cultural Diversity (eds. Y. Donders et alii), Utrecht, SIM, 1999, pp. 41, 72 and 77. 24 . Cf. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child - A Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires (ed. S. Detrick), Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1992, pp. 1-703. 25 26 . With very rare exceptions. . Cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, Tratado de Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, vol. II, Porto Alegre/Brasil, S.A. Fabris Ed., 1999, pp. 338-358. - Thus, the so-called "cultural relativism" in the domain of the International Law of Human Rights is thereby marked by too many fallacies. I feel also unable to accept the so-called "juridical relativismo" in the domain of Public International Law: such relativism is nothing but a neopositivist outlook of the international legal order, from an anachronistic State-centred perspective, rather than community-centred (the civitas maxima gentium). Equally unsustainable appears to me the "realist" trend in contemporary legal and social sciences, with their intellectual cowardice and their capitulation before the raw "reality" of the facts (as if these latter were reduced to product of a simple historical inevitability).