5 be the subject of a petition for writ of reversal on cassation; and iii) allows for the use of and ex officio request for factual evidence. In this way, the State claimed, the right to an accessible remedy for the thorough reexamination of a conviction was ensured and is ridden, for the most part, of complexity. 21. The State also noted that when a conviction becomes final and conclusive because the petition for a writ of reversal on cassation has been denied, the motion for review of conviction may be pursued. In this regard, it alleged that the new statute also did away with the formal requirements of said remedy, inasmuch as several motions to review conviction may now be filed on grounds of due process violations, including a violation of the right to appeal a criminal conviction. The State specified that these requirements no longer apply, except when the claim has been heard on previous cassation petition or in another previous motion to review conviction. It also noted that under this law, the conviction review procedure “has a broadness similar to that of the petition for writ on cassation, which can be filed against a conviction.” Lastly, the State noted that under this statute, it is prohibited for the same judge or court to sit on the panel of judges in more than one proceeding on the same matter. 22. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the State asserted that the adjustments and changes made under Law No. 8503 “involved asymmetries or imperfections in the criminal appeals system, and in the judicial structure in charge of applying it, which arose as a collateral effect of actual and effective enforcement that the liberal reform had, mainly with regard to the jurisdiction of the courts of cassation and the emergence of conflicting legal precedents.” It emphasized that said situation raised “the need to institute a structural reform to make it possible to overcome the asymmetries, which are produced in any process of change, inconsistencies that in no way involve an infringement or disregard of the right of a defendant in a criminal proceeding to challenge the conviction before a higher judge or court for comprehensive examination thereof.” 23. Because of the foregoing considerations, the State of Costa Rica maintained that, in 2010, Law No. 8837 was enacted, “Law creating a conviction appeal procedure, other reforms to the appeals system and Implementing new rules on oral proceedings in criminal matters,” which came into force on December 9, 2011. It claimed that under said law, not only did it keep the writ of reversal on cassation in place, but it also created the motion for appeal of criminal conviction, whereby a conviction became reviewable by a higher court. 24. With regard to persons who have received final judgment of conviction and who consider the right set forth in Article 8.2.h of the American Convention to have been violated, as in the case of the alleged victims of the instant petition, the State contended that their only option is to pursue the motion for review of conviction before the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court. It argued that granting said motion “is at the discretion of the judges” (extraordinario) and it underscored that “there is no other procedural formula [available], inasmuch as the criminal proceeding they underwent has already concluded, and as of that point in time, the ruling takes on the status of res judicata.” It further noted: “if a judgment is final and conclusive, it may not be considered appealable.” 25. Additionally, the State asserted that said motion for review of judgment would be admissible if three requirements are met. Firstly, it noted that there must have been prior allegations as to the violation of Article 8.2.h of the American Convention either on a previously filed petition for cassation or a prior motion for review of conviction. 26. Secondly, the State argued that the appellant must specifically define in concrete terms the offense what he or she believes was caused by the violation, for which he is appealing the ruling. It