B. Position of the State 27. The State argues that in order for the international justice system to be activated, a violation of human rights must have occurred and that violation must be attributable to a State party of the Organization of American States, which did not occur in this case, since Mr. Palma was disappeared by ordinary citizens. International responsibility cannot be attributed to the Ecuadorian State, therefore, for a crime that was not committed by its agents since that would vitiate the inter-American system for the protection of human rights. 28. The State argues that it launched a serious and effective investigation leading to the discovery of the parties responsible for the crime and that these persons were punished according to the country’s domestic legislation. The State indicates that by virtue of the March 19, 2001 judgment issued by the Sixth Criminal Court of Manabi, Freddy Simón Contreras, Lenin Ordóñez Ortiz, and Stanley Domínguez Avilés were sanctioned for the kidnapping and murder of Marco Bienvenido Palma Mendoza. The State contends that the guilty parties appealed the verdict to the cassation court, but that the appeal was rejected. It points out that the sentence was upheld by the Second Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on June 26, 2002. 29. With regards to the petitioners’ allegation that there is a civil liability that has not been repaired, the State argues that the Ecuadorian legal system has effective recourse for obtaining indemnity from those liable for civil damages, which is oral summary proceedings (juicio verbal sumario).6 It contends that such proceedings would be effective recourse in this case in as much as the goal is to indemnify existing patrimonial damages, that is to say, the civil liability for damages allegedly incurred. 30. The State maintains that the petition presented by the petitioners does not comply with the requirement of Article 47(b) of the Convention because no facts have been presented that imply a violation of the provisions contained in that international instrument. For that reason, it asks the IACHR to declare the case inadmissible. 31. The State also argues that it is not the role of the IACHR to act as a quasijudicial fourth instance and review the decisions of national courts.7 It contends that the Commission can only review judgments made by national courts when there is a violation of one of the rights enshrined in the American Convention, a situation that is not present in this case. 32. In relationship to the alleged violation of Articles 4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), and 7 (right to personal liberty) of the Convention, the State asserts that since the population at first suspected that military intelligence agents had been involved in the kidnapping and execution of Mr. Palma, the Attorney General of the State, on September 27, 1999, asked the Intelligence Division of the Ecuadorian Land Forces, an entity attached to the Ministry of National Defense, for information about Mr. Palma’s situation. It asserts that the director of that entity began the pertinent investigations to gather information and, based on this investigation, it was determined that “the Armed Forces of Ecuador did not at any time participate in the detention and/or kidnapping of the citizen Marco Bienvenido Palma Mendoza.” 6 The State asserts that in accordance with Article 331 of the Criminal Code of Procedure applied to the events of this case: “in the case of a guilty verdict, a suit for damages shall not suspend the execution of the sentence and shall be substantiated before the president of the criminal court, in oral summary proceedings and in a separate log.” 7 In its written communication received May 31, 2006, the State cites Resolution 29/88 of the InterAmerican Commission related to Case 9260, contained in the Annual Report of the IACHR 1987-1988, p. 161. para. 5.