97 Articles 7(b) and 7(c) of the Belém do Para Convention, to the detriment of the three victims’ next of kin identified in paragraph 9 supra. 4.3. Obligation not to discriminate: violence against women as discrimination 390. The Commission indicated that, “[i]n order to appreciate the scope of the obligation of due diligence in this case, it is essential to understand the relationship between violence against women and the discrimination that perpetuates it.” According to the Commission, “the investigation into these murders was influenced by discriminatory attitudes towards women by state officials.” 391. The representatives indicated that “over and above gender-based violence, the girls and women of Ciudad Juárez suffer a double discrimination, because the humble origins of Claudia, Laura and Esmeralda, and of the other girls and women who have been murdered or reported missing, and of their mothers and their next of kin, also generates discrimination against a social class.” They added that the damage caused by the facts of the case “is reinforced because its purpose is to preserve the inequality of women and discrimination towards them” and that, “added to the other situations of vulnerability, the damage is exacerbated because the impunity created and encouraged by the Mexican State supports and legitimizes the patterns of violence and discrimination against women.” 392. The State indicated that “the investigation into the disappearances and murders of Mss. González, Herrera and Ramos, does not reveal any element that could allow it to be supposed that there was any discrimination.” It added that it “had established the necessary mechanisms to ensure that all persons under its jurisdiction […] can exercise […] their rights without being subjected to discrimination of any kind.” Nevertheless, before the Court, it acknowledged that the murders of women in Ciudad Juárez are influenced by “a culture of discrimination against women.” 393. Given the dispute between the parties and the ambiguity of the State’s acquiescence, the Tribunal will analyze whether the obligation not to discriminate contained in Article 1(1) of the Convention was fulfilled in this case. 394. From a general point of view, CEDAW has defined discrimination against women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” In the Inter-American sphere, the Convention of Belém do Pará indicates that violence against women is “a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between women and men” and recognizes that the right of every woman to a life free of violence includes the right to be free from all forms of discrimination. 395. CEDAW has stated that the definition of discrimination against women “includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman [i] because she is a woman or [ii] that affects women disproportionately.” CEDAW has also indicated that “gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.”412 396. In the case of Opuz v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights stated that “the State’s failure to protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection of the law and that this failure does not need to be intentional.” The European Court considered that even though the general and discriminatory judicial 412 Cf. CEDAW, General recommendation 19: Violence against women, supra note 268, paras. 1 and 6.