99 The influence exerted by discriminatory socio-cultural patterns may cause a victim’s credibility to be questioned in cases involving violence, or lead to a tacit assumption that she is somehow to blame for what happened, whether because of her manner of dress, her occupation, her sexual conduct, relationship or kinship to the assailant and so on. The result is that prosecutors, police and judges fail to take action on complaints of violence. These biased discriminatory patterns can also exert a negative influence on the investigation of such cases and the subsequent weighing of the evidence, where stereotypes about how women should conduct themselves in interpersonal relations can become a factor.415 401. Similarly, the Tribunal finds that gender stereotyping refers to a preconception of personal attributes, characteristics or roles that correspond or should correspond to either men or women. Bearing in mind the statements made by the State (supra para. 398), the subordination of women can be associated with practices based on persistent socially-dominant gender stereotypes, a situation that is exacerbated when the stereotypes are reflected, implicitly or explicitly, in policies and practices and, particularly, in the reasoning and language of the judicial police authorities, as in this case. The creation and use of stereotypes becomes one of the causes and consequences of gender-based violence against women. 402. The Court therefore finds that, in the instant case, the violence against women constituted a form of discrimination, and declares that the State violated the obligation not to discriminate contained in Article 1(1) of the Convention, in relation to the obligation to guarantee the rights embodied in Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2) and 7(1) of the American Convention to the detriment of Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez, Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Claudia Ivette González; as well as in relation to the access to justice established in Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention, to the detriment of the victims’ next of kin identified in paragraph 9 supra. 5. The rights of girls, Article 19 of the American Convention 403. The Commission alleged that the State’s “duty to protect the human rights of Laura Berenice Ramos and Esmeralda Herrera Monreal was enhanced, for two reasons: their condition as minors, and the obligation to adopt special measures of protection, prevention and guarantee.” However, according to the Commission, “[n]ot only did the state agencies charged with enforcing the law fail to act to prevent acts such as those herein described, and to identify and punish those responsible, but those state agencies specifically charged with the protection of children did not intervene in any way, either to prevent these facts, or to propose some kind of solution for the case.” 404. According to the representatives, Esmeralda Herrera and Laura Berenice Ramos “were murdered eight years after the first murders of girls and women in Ciudad Juárez were recorded. The State had the obligation to adopt special measures of protection to ensure their life, liberty and personal integrity.” They indicated that the State “had failed to adopt measures to prevent violence in the community and to guarantee full enjoyment of the fundamental rights of the child.” 405. The State affirmed that it “complies with its obligation to protect children by adopting measures that correspond to their special situation of vulnerability.” It also maintained that it had not incurred in international responsibility because “state agents had not participated directly in the murders […], and it had not been proved that the fact that the victims were minors had been a relevant factor”; also, because it has implemented “special measures to ensure the full exercise of the rights of the child.” 415 IACHR, Access to justice for women victims of violence in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 68, January 20, 2007 (case file of attachments to the application, volume VII, attachment 2, folio 1822).