15 relation to other States, but towards the individuals subject to their jurisdiction.35 In addition, these treaties are applied in keeping with the concept of collective guarantee.36 63. In the instant case, the State indicated that the teleological interpretation arises from the fact that, while Article 12 fails to mention the Court, “Article 11 grants it exclusive jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions.” This indicates that “the intention of the parties to the treaty was precisely to delimit the powers of the Court to its advisory function.” The Commission and the representatives indicated that the Court cannot refrain from exercising jurisdiction to hear cases relating to violations of the Convention of Belém do Pará, because this would be contrary to the “principle of effectiveness.” In this regard, the State indicated that “the Convention already ensures effectiveness and the application of this principle does not imply that the Court exercises its jurisdiction over [that Convention]”; because this would “deny or question” the functions performed by the Inter-American Commission of Women and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights within the framework of the mechanisms of protection established by the Convention of Belém do Pará. 64. The State’s allegation that the Court does not have compulsory jurisdiction, because Article 11 of the Convention of Belém do Pará only grants advisory jurisdiction to the Court, does not support that position but, to the contrary, contradicts it. Indeed, the advisory jurisdiction is not included in Articles 44 to 51 of the American Convention, so that it had to be established expressly in another provision. 65. Regarding the principle of effectiveness, the Court reiterates what it indicated in its first judgment, to the effect that the inherent purpose of all treaties is to be effective.37 This is applicable to the provisions of the American Convention related to the authority of the Commission to submit cases to the Court and this is one of the provisions referred to by the Convention of Belém do Pará. 1.4. Complementary interpretation criteria; the preparatory work for the Convention of Belém do Pará 66. The State affirmed that “the representatives of the States discussed extensively the way in which violations could be claimed […], concluding that the Commission would be the only competent body to hear such complaints,” and expressing their “disagreement with granting jurisprudential powers to the Inter-American Court to review possible violations” of said Convention. In addition, according to the State, the Article included in the draft of this Convention that authorized the Court to hear violations thereof, “was not included in the final version of the [C]onvention.” Furthermore, it indicated that “the authority to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of a court is a sovereign act of each State with no limits other than the will of the State.” It concluded that “it is evident that it was the intention of the signatory States to define the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission to hear individual petitions concerning alleged violations of [this] Convention.” 67. The Commission refuted the State’s arguments concerning the travaux préparatorires for the Convention of Belém do Pará and considered that “the States never discussed […] the possibility of excluding the material jurisdiction of the Court 35 Cf. “Other Treaties” Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), supra note 29, para. 29. 36 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 55, para. 41, and Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, supra note 27, para. 42. 37 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections, supra note 29, para. 30.