3 7. In line and consonance with the case law of the European Court, the InterAmerican Court has been evolving its own jurisprudence criteria on the obligation to prevent. Ever since its first jurisprudence in the 1988 case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, the Court mentioned – and reiterated- the concept that the State has the obligation to “reasonably” prevent human rights violations.11 In more recent cases, the Court has established the components to define and clarify the content of the “obligation to prevent” in line with decisions of the European Court such as those cited. 8. In the case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, the Court established clear criteria using concepts that were reiterated subsequently in the cases of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay12 and Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia.13 Thus, in the Pueblo Bello case, the Court established that: […] the Court acknowledges that a State cannot be responsible for all the human rights violations committed between individuals within its jurisdiction. Indeed, the nature erga omnes of the treaty-based guarantee obligations of the States does not imply their unlimited responsibility for all acts or deeds of individuals, because its obligations to adopt prevention and protection measures for individuals in their relationships with each other are conditioned by the awareness of a situation of real and imminent danger for a specific individual or group of individuals and to the reasonable possibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger. In other words, even though an act, omission or deed of an individual has the legal consequence of violating the specific human rights of another individual, this is not automatically attributable to the State, because the specific circumstances of the case and the execution of these guarantee obligations must be considered.14 9. Consequently, the Court has established that the State does not have “unlimited responsibility for all acts or deeds of individuals,”15 and that the obligation to prevent has – in general and with the exception of special situations in which the State occupies a special position of guarantor – three components that must all be present: (1) the “awareness of a situation of real and imminent danger”; (2) “a specific individual or group of individuals,” and (3) “reasonable possibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger.”16 These concepts were referred to with regard to the standard of “real and imminent danger” in the cases of Ríos et al. v. Venezuela17 and Perozo et al. v. Venezuela.18 10. When deciding the instant case, the Court recalled what it had already determined in the Velásquez Rodríguez case concerning the obligation to prevent “reasonably,” (para. 236) and reiterated the three criteria that comprise the obligation to prevent established in the jurisprudence of this Court and of the European Court, recapitulated in the preceding paragraph 11 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 174. 12 Cf. Case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006. Series C No. 146, para. 155. 13 Cf. Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2008. Series C No. 192, para. 78. 14 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 123. 15 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 14, para. 123. 16 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 14, para. 123. 17 Cf. Case of Ríos et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C No. 194, para. 110. 18 Cf. Case of Perozo et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C No. 195, para. 121.