9 28. Despite the foregoing, the Court notes that, although the State accepted said facts in general terms, in its subsequent arguments on the merits of the matter, it disputed specific facts relating to the context and to the “first stage” of the investigations. Accordingly, in the following chapters, the Court will determine the entire factual framework of this case and will provide the relevant explanation when it accepts that a fact has been established based on the State’s acceptance, or has been proved by the evidence provided by the parties. 29. As regards the legal claims, the Court declares that the dispute has ceased in relation to the violation of Articles 5(1), 8(1), 25(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of the victims’ next of kin who have been identified supra para. 9, based on the violations accepted by the State in the “first stage” of the investigations. However, it declares that the dispute subsists concerning the alleged violations of Articles 4, 5, 7, 11 and 19 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, and of Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. The dispute also subsists with regard to the alleged violation of Article 5 of the American Convention for facts that differ from those acknowledged by the State, in relation to the victims’ next of kin, as well as in regard to the alleged violation of Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, with respect to the “second stage” of the investigations. 30. Lastly, regarding the claims for reparations, the State accepted that it had the obligation to make reparation for the violations that it had accepted and indicated a series of measures of redress that it had implemented or offered to implement, which will be considered in Chapter IX of this Judgment, in accordance with the arguments and evidence presented by the parties. IV PRELIMINARY OBJECTION (LACK OF JURISDICTION RATIONE MATERIAE OF THE COURT) 31. The State alleged that the Court did not have jurisdiction to “determine violations” of the Convention of Belém do Pará. This was rejected by the Commission and the representatives, who argued that the Court had jurisdiction in relation to Article 7 of that Convention. The representatives alleged that the Court also has jurisdiction to “examine violations” of Article 9 and “apply Article 8” of that Convention. 32. To decide disputes over the interpretation of norms, the Court has invoked the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,27 which indicates in this regard: Article 31. General rule of interpretation. (1) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. […] Article 32. Supplementary means of interpretation. Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) (b) 27 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 54, para. 38, and Case of Blake v. Guatemala. Interpretation of the Judgment on Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 1, 1999. Series C No. 57, para. 21.