11 27. With this in mind, the Article 41(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure states that in the State’s answer to the application, the State shall indicate whether it accepts the facts and claims or whether it contradicts them. Additionally, Article 41(3) therein it provides that the Court “may consider those facts that have not been expressly denied and those claims that have not been expressly contested as accepted.” 28. Although the State did not specify the facts it accepts and the violations it recognized, but rather, even objected to some of the reparations requested, it is clearly willing to accept the alleged facts and violations, in particular, those relating to the three victims in this case. Thus, the State’s acknowledgment constitutes a partial admission of the facts, as well as a partial acquiescence to the claims set forth in the Commission’s application and in the representatives’ brief of pleadings and motions. Therefore, although limited to those human rights violations, which occurred during “the de [f]acto government that reigned in Uruguay between June 1973 and February 1985,” Article 41 of the Rules of Procedure is fully applicable to this case. 29. The State’s partial acknowledgment is a positive contribution to the developments in this proceeding, to the validity of the principles underlying the American Convention, and to the conduct to which the States are bound pursuant to their commitments as States Parties to international human rights instruments.12 30. On these terms, the Court considers, as in other cases,13 that this acknowledgment generates full legal effect in accordance with the provisions in question and that it adds important symbolic value in regard to the prevention and reoccurrence of similar events. 31. The facts of this case were neither contested nor challenged on the record, and, as it shall be seen, said facts are duly proven on the record. The time limit set forth in said acknowledgment is irrelevant to the analysis of the merits and reparations in the present case. In addition, controversy persists regarding the determination of the consequences of the events that have occurred since February 1985. In such a way, the Tribunal finds it necessary to deliver a Judgment establishing the facts and determining the merits of the case, as well as the consequences in regard to the appropriate reparations14. B. Alleged victims in the present case                                                          12 Cf. Case of Trujillo Oroza V. Bolivia. Merits. Judgment of January 26, 2000. Series C No. 64, para. 42; Case of Rosendo Cantú et al., supra note 9, para. 25, and Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña, supra note 9, para. 37. 13 Cf. Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. V. Perú. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, paras. 176 to 180; Case of Tiu Tojín V. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 26, 2008. Series C No. 190, para. 21, and Case of Kimel V. Argentina, supra note 10, paras. 23 to 25. See also, Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, supra note 11, para. 18. 14 Cf. Case of the Mapiripan Massacre V. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 69; Case of Rosendo Cantú et al., supra note 9, para. 26, and Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña, supra note 9, para. 38.