the case and altered the very content of the domestic acts that were submitted to its jurisdiction. 23. Thus, with due respect, it would correspond to the State’s judicial authorities, at the domestic level, to determine whether or not Mr. Hendrix was domiciled in the country. When they had the opportunity, the domestic courts did not do so. In this situation, I believe that, in light of the Convention, the Court should have given value to the requirement they applied rather than to the one they failed to apply. 24. It is also necessary to analyze what the State’s measure was actually based on, even in cases in which the characteristic adopted by the State when applying the measure was not, in fact, verified, or in cases such as that of Mr. Hendrix, even if there were other factual impediments to the exercise of a specific right.26 It is not sufficient that it was possible to justify the State’s measure; it should have been justified for the correct reasons. 25. The majority position of the Court, from which I dissent, was based on the following question: If the State had applied the most appropriate requirement under the Convention – rootedness (domicile) – could Mr. Hendrix have been a notary? As I have been able to demonstrate in the preceding paragraphs, this question deviates from the factual framework by not assessing the specific conduct of the State. Thus, the question that should have been asked is the following: Did the restriction on access to the notarial profession based on the nationality requirement violate the Convention? I will devote the following sections to answering this second question, which relates to the matter that was really submitted to the Court in Hendrix v. Guatemala. (b) Violation of the right to equality and non-discrimination (i) Equality and non-discrimination standards in relation to nationality 26. Discrimination, in its broadest and most descriptive sense, consists in according a different treatment to anyone who has a specific characteristic or trait precisely because that person possesses that trait.27 In its strictest and most legal sense, discrimination is a serious moral offense: it is treating someone differently in a way that prejudices them, causing them a disadvantage (often structural and with historical roots), without justification - that is to say, for a supposed reason (having this or that socially undervalued trait) – which is not a valid reason,28 in violation of the duty not to accord different treatment to individuals in similar circumstances, when the only differentiating factor is that trait.29 Discriminatory treatment is unjust and frequently the result of ignorance, stereotyping, prejudice and stigmatization.30 The type of demeaning treatment produced 26 It is not a question of applying the concept of “discrimination by perception” directly to Mr. Hendrix, but of demonstrating the relevance of the reason for the difference applied by the State, even though this does not necessarily lead to different results. For the concept of “discrimination by perception” see Case of Flor Freire v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2016. Series C No. 315. Cf. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art 2, para. 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 16, E/C.12/GC/20. Cf. GARDNER, John, Discrimination: The Good, the Bad, and the Wrongful, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, v. 118, n. 1, p. 55-81, 2018, p. 56. 27 28 Ibid., p. 64 and 65. 29 Ibid., p. 73. Cf. GARDNER, J, Discrimination as Injustice, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, v. 16, n. 3, p. 353-368, 1996, p. 355. “The primary duties of the law relating to sex and race discrimination are duties to treat people in certain ways defined by reference to the way that others are treated. As the very name ‘discrimination’ implies, they are duties essentially concerned with people’s relative positions.” SOLANKE, Iyiola, Discrimination as stigma: a theory of anti-discrimination law, Oxford; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2017; ALEXANDER, Larry, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, v. 141, n. 1, p. 149-219, 1992. 30 6