law in this area or whether it violated the petitioner’s right to equality and nondiscrimination. To this end, I will now examine the substantive justification of the State’s conduct based on the proportionality test. The Court has used this test extensively and signified that, once the sphere of protection of a specific right has been breached, the intervention can only be considered proportionate if it satisfies the criteria of strict appropriateness (or suitability), necessity and proportionality.55 (ii) Discriminatory nature of the professional restriction based on nationality 41. Any restriction of the rights recognized in the American Convention should comply with the basic requirements of Article 30, and may only be applied pursuant to a law enacted for reasons of general interest, and for the purpose for which it was established. Thus, before applying the proportionality test to the measure, it is necessary to verify: (i) whether the restrictive measure was previously established by law, and (ii) whether it had a legitimate objective. 42. Regarding the requirement of legality, inter-American case law is categorical in noting that any restriction of rights must be expressly established in a prior law, as a way of guaranteeing that such restrictions are not left to the discretion of the public authorities. In this regard, I can confirm that the requirement of Guatemalan nationality by birth or naturalization for membership in the professional association is established in article 2(1) of the Notarial Code. Also, the legal provision requiring renunciation of the nationality of origin in order to acquire Guatemalan nationality is contained in article 37 of the Nationality Law, which should be interpreted in light of article 146 of the Constitution of the Republic. Those norms were issued pursuant to the procedures required by Guatemalan law and adopted by the Legislature. I therefore consider that this requirement is met. 43. Regarding the existence of a legitimate objective for the restriction of the exercise of the notarial profession based on the criterion of nationality, I consider it important to point out that, here, I will only examine whether the objective alleged by the State may be considered legitimate.56 Recognizing the existence of a legitimate objective or purpose does not signify admitting that the measure adopted can contribute to achieving the said objective – an analysis made in relation to the standard of suitability under the proportionality test.57 As the Court has emphasized previously, the legitimacy of the purpose “does not necessarily mean that the restriction in question has been legal [...], using the most suitable, necessary or proportionate means.”58 44. Contrary to other provisions of the Convention, for example, Articles 13(2) and 16, the content of which provide a textual basis for delimiting an important aspect of a State’s laws and regulations; namely, the legitimate purposes of restrictions, Articles 1(1) and 24 Cf. Case of Valencia Campos et al. v. Bolivia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 18, 2022. Series C No. 469. Separate opinion of Judge Nancy Hernández López and Judge Rodrigo Mudrovitsch, para. 43. 55 56 A similar analysis was made, for example in Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela: “To that end, the Court reiterates that when analyzing the legitimacy of the objective in this case (the protection of the right to honor of the Armed Forces) the idea is not to determine whether the Armed Forces have an effective “right” to honor or reputation; the analysis is to determine whether such objective would be legitimate for the purpose of restricting the right to freedom of expression of Mr. Usón Ramírez.” Cf. Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207, para. 63. 57 Despite the different focuses of the criteria, even in cases in which the existence of a legitimate objective and the suitability of the measure are examined together, these are two clearly differentiated stages. Thus, “the Court must determine whether the protection of the reputation of the Armed Forces serves a lawful purpose that justifies a restriction of freedom of expression and, as the case may be, whether a criminal sanction is suitable to achieve such purpose.” Cf. Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207, para. 62. Cf. Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207, para. 66 58 11