71. Based on the foregoing considerations of the risks involved in the use of the Armed Forces in citizen security duties, the Commission highlights that the aforementioned preventive obligations to regulate, train, equip and oversee (supra par. XX) are even more important in the case before us. Consequently, when such duties are assigned to the Armed Forces, an assessment of compliance must be particularly strict. 72. Applying this principle to the case at hand, the State did not submit any information on the existence of any adequate legal framework regulating the use of force by its security forces, including military members assigned to carry out law enforcement duties. In addition to that failure, the State did not report on the existence of any protocols of supervision or control over operations by the military posted in Baborigame in which force could legitimately be used, or of any training on the “use of force” provided to these agents. Internal investigations have not turned up any references to any items of this nature either. 73. On the contrary, in 1998, the year the incidents in the case took place, the Commission released its Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico after conducting an in situ visit to the country. In said report, the Commission expressed particular concern over the information it received about the impact of assigning law enforcement duties to the Armed Forces. In the words of the IACHR in both the report and the final press release at the end of the country visit: During its on-site visit to Mexico, the IACHR received information on the exercise of police functions by officials of the Armed Forces. The obvious result is the militarization of the leaders of the organizations in charge of ensuring the security of citizens. In this regard, the Commission had the following to say in Press Release No. 14/96, issued on July 24, 1996: …based on its experience, it wishes to draw attention to the consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in functions involving the security of citizens, since this could lead to serious violations of human rights because of the military nature and the training received by the Armed Forces.91 74. Consequently, the Commission concludes that the Mexican State assigned law enforcement duties to the Armed Forces in the area where Mr. Trueba was killed, with all the risks that it implies as noted by both the IACHR and the Court, without having the necessary safeguards in place as to the regulation, training, equipment and oversight required in order to prevent arbitrary deprivations of the right to life as a consequence of the use of force by said agents. 75. This serious omission by the Mexican State created an atmosphere, that was conducive to the commission of violations of said right, which in and of itself is incompatible with Article 4.1 of the American Convention, in connection with the obligations to respect rights and of domestic legal effects set forth in Articles 1.1 and 2 of the same instrument. 1.2. Examination of actions at the time of the events: Use of deadly force against Mr. Trueba 76. When allegations are made that a death was the result of the use of force, the Inter-American Court has established clear rules on the burden of proof. In the words of the Court: Whenever the use of force [by state agents] results in the death or injuries to one or more individuals, the State has the obligation to give a satisfactory and convincing explanation of 91 IACHR. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.100. Doc. 7 rev. 1. September 24, 1998. Par. 399. 14