constituted a “lack of truth” by the investigating body, which failed to consider the context of forced disappearances and the application of the doctrine of “the enemy within,” Mr. Movilla’s wife’s statements regarding surveillance activities, nor the interrogation of H.J.C.R. (supra paras. 73 and 74). They added that in 1997 the case was forwarded to the Regional Specialized Human Rights Unit of the Prosecutor General’s Office, but it was not until 2019 that P.J.P.D. was “linked to the case following an investigation.” They also stressed that there was still no news of Mr. Movilla’s whereabouts, and argued that Colombia had violated the “autonomous right to search for and, if possible, locate the victims of forced disappearance, as the State had an obligation to search for, identify, and hand over the victims of this crime.” 170 151. The representatives also said that “Colombia has denied for years the existence of information about Pedro Movilla in intelligence agency records,” and that this was “proven to be untrue following the judicial inspection carried out in 2020.” They added that, “de facto restrictions have been encountered in attempting to access intelligence agency records.” 152. The representatives affirmed that Colombia had violated the “autonomous right to know the truth derived from Articles 8(1), 13 and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights in relation to Article 1(1) of the same instrument.” They also claimed that the violation of the “autonomous right” to search for a victim (supra para. 150) was a violation of “Articles 5, 8(1) and 25 of the American Convention on Human Rights and Articles I a), I d) and XIV of the IACFDP.” 153. The State asked the Court “to view positively the efforts it has implemented to guarantee the right of access to the truth” and to declare that it had not violated Articles 8(1), 13(1) and 25 of the American Convention. It argued that the right to the truth “is not a matter of unrestricted autonomy” and is not absolute. It added that, in this case, it is subsumed under the right to access justice, under Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention. It maintained that it has implemented “legal-institutional strategies aimed at guaranteeing the right to the truth in its individual and collective dimensions,” 171 and that any ruling declaring it had violated that right would impose “disproportionate and unreasonable burdens” on the State. In relation to the specific case, the State “partially” acknowledged its responsibility for violating the right to truth, “because of the errors and/or omissions evidenced at the start of the criminal proceedings.” However, it maintained that any judgment that ruled it had violated the right in general would be “a serious disregard of the structural, institutional, and social efforts that Colombia […] has made.”172 Moreover, Colombia did not expressly accept the existence of an “autonomous right” They argued that the alleged right was violated because of a lack of due diligence and a failure to carry out the investigations within a reasonable time, and the absence, until May 2020, of interagency coordination of search actions. 171 Colombia maintained that it identified the collective dimension of the right to the truth with the “duty of historical memory,” and alluded to the fact that, within the framework of transitional justice in the country, the right to the truth had assumed vital importance. In this regard, it referred to various “judicial and extrajudicial measures adopted at the national level, to […] guarantee the right to the truth,” and highlighted the following: (i) Law 975 of 2005 (Justice and Peace Act); (ii) Law 1448 of 2011 (Victims and Land Restitution Act); (iii) Final Agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and lasting peace, of November 24, 2016 (Final Agreement); (iv) case law of the Colombian Constitutional Court; and, (v) “Institutional framework of the right to the truth in Colombia.” It mentioned articles of the legislation in question that refer to the right to the truth; it referred to the creation, following the “Final Agreement,” of the “Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition” (SIVJRNR), “including the Special Jurisdiction for Peace”; it alluded to guidelines set forth by the Constitutional Court on the right to the truth, and drew attention to “institutions and procedures” designed to guarantee the right to the truth (it highlighted, in this regard, the National Center for Historical Memory and certain “developments” stemming from the Final Agreement: the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition (CEV), the Special Unit for the Search for Disappeared Persons in the context and because of the armed conflict (UBPD) and the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP),” which has a “Special Court for acknowledgement of the truth, responsibility and determination of facts and conduct.” 172 It argued that recognizing the autonomy of the right would imply that it would be violated even if the State acts diligently in the investigations but does not achieve results. 170 41