251. The Court recalls that, based on its case law, costs and expenses form part of the concept of reparation, because the activities carried out by the victims in order to obtain justice, both at the national and the international level, entail disbursements that must be compensated when the State’s international responsibility is declared in a judgment. Regarding the reimbursement of costs and expenses, it is for the Court to prudently assess their scope, which includes the expenses generated before the authorities of the domestic jurisdiction and those incurred during the proceedings before the inter-American system, bearing in mind the circumstances of the specific case and the nature of the international jurisdiction for the protection of human rights. This assessment may be made based on the principle of equity and taking into account the expenses indicated by the parties, provided their quantum is reasonable.241 252. This Court has established that “the claims of the victims or their representatives with regard to costs and expenses, and the evidence to support them, must be submitted to the Court at the first procedural opportunity granted to them; that is, in the pleadings and motions brief, without prejudice to such claims being updated subsequently, in keeping with the new costs and expenses incurred during the proceedings before this Court.” 242 The Court also reiterates that it is not sufficient merely to forward evidentiary documents; rather, the parties are required to include arguments that relate the evidence to the facts that they represent and, in the case of alleged financial disbursements, clearly specify the items and their justification. 243 253. Bearing in mind the amounts requested by the representatives and the expense vouchers presented,244 the Court decides to establish, based on equity, the payment of forty thousand United States dollars (USD 40,000.00) for costs and expenses. This sum shall be delivered directly to the José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Association. When monitoring compliance with this judgment at a later stage, the Court may order the State to reimburse the victims or their representatives for any reasonable and duly proven expenses incurred at that point in the proceedings.245 I) Method of compliance with payments ordered 254. The State must pay compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, the reimbursement of costs and expenses, and the cost of the rehabilitation measure established in this judgment (supra paras. 216, 244, 245, 247, 248 and 253), directly to the persons indicated herein and to the CCAJAR, within the established timeframe or, failing that, within one year of Cf. Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina. Reparations and costs. Judgment of August 27, 1998. Series C No. 39, paras. 82; and Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile, supra, para. 200. 242 Cf. Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, supra, para. 79; and Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile, supra, para. 201. 243 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 277; and Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile, supra, para. 201. 244 The Court accepts, based on the representatives’ arguments concerning the expenses they are claiming, that the amount indicated is an estimate for which they cannot provide full details (although they did send receipts for some of their expenditures). The explanation is as follows. The representatives stated that “it is not possible to calculate exactly the amounts invested” between 1993 and 2001. For that period, they considered the cost of the work of three professionals. They based their calculations on the minimum salary during those years, which, they affirmed, was less than what similar professionals actually received. They did not specify their expenses during the period from 2002 to 2011. They said that the workload increased in 2011 and at least five legal professionals and several assistants took part, and travel expenses were also incurred. They gave details of the salaries of the professionals concerned during the years that each one was involved. They did not specify whether, at the time when they received the salaries for which reimbursement is being sought, the professionals worked on the case full time or part time. Nor did they do so with respect to the period from 1993 to 2001. They did not attach receipts for salaries paid. Moreover, during the period from 1993 to 2001, they included the cost of a lawyer who acted in the administrative proceedings, which were not examined and had no impact on the violations declared in this judgment. 245 Cf. Case of Ibsen Cárdenas and Ibsen Peña v. Bolivia, supra para. 291; and Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile, supra, para. 202. 241 63