34 compensation in respect of any violations”. Rather, the representatives requested a “direction that the State of Barbados commute the death sentence of [Mr.] Michael Huggins and substitute therefore a sentence of life imprisonment with appropriate opportunity to apply for parole.” Additionally, the representatives requested that the Court order the State to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to: 1) ensure that the death penalty is not imposed in a manner inconsistent with the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention, and in particular, that it is not imposed through mandatory sentencing and that it is not given effect by hanging, 2) ensure that the conditions of detention in which the victims are held comply with the requirements of the American Convention, including the right to humane treatment under Article 5 of the Convention, and 3) remove the immunizing effect of section 26 of the Constitution of Barbados in respect of “existing laws”. In relation to costs, the representatives emphasized that they do not seek any legal fees in relation to this case, but rather seek the recovery of expenses incurred in respect of the hearing before this Court, including travel and per diem allowance, accommodation for the legal representatives and the expert witnesses attending the hearing, and an additional amount representing the costs involving couriers, affidavit fees, photocopying and travel expenses incurred in visiting prisons. 124. The State submitted that there was no need “for any reparations, including legislative and other measures, compensation, costs and expenses”, as the State had not incurred in any violation of the American Convention. In the alternative, the State submitted that if the Court were to find the State responsible for violations of the Convention, then “the only suitable form of reparation that could be provided is the commutation of the death sentence of the Petitioners.” Additionally, the State mentioned that if the Court decided “to order the State to undertake legislative or other measures, then […] any such measures in and of themselves would fully satisfy the obligations of the State to correct any existing violations as well as to guarantee that the particular human rights obligations will be respected in the future.” Furthermore, the State emphasized that the representatives had expressly denied a request for compensation, had thus waived their legal fees, and that, at most, a nominal award of costs should be made. 125. The Court acknowledges that the representatives have not requested monetary compensation in the present case. Accordingly, the Court considers that the appropriate measures to redress the violations declared in the present Judgment must be those that provide satisfaction for the injured party and that guarantee the non-repetition of such violations. C.1) Measures of Satisfaction 126. First and foremost, the Court considers that the present Judgment per se is a form of reparation136 that should be understood as a form of satisfaction that recognizes that the rights of Messrs. Boyce, Joseph, Huggins, and Atkins addressed in the present Judgment have been violated by the State. 136 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero V. Ecuador. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 20, 1999. Series C No. 44, para. 72; Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz, supra note 25, para. 180, and Case of Zambrano Vélez et al., supra note 25, para. 142.