precision would be appropriate here, also in relation to quantifications that seem to me lack all sense of being. The cases under supervision of the compliance of the Judgment of the Court are not cases “en process”, as they have been incorrectly characterized in order to try to feed “productivity” statistical graphs of this Tribunal (and impress the unwary). They are, instead, cases that have already been processed with regard to their merits and reparations and they are awaiting the comprehensive compliance of the corresponding Judgments, that is, cases totally or partially not complied with by the corresponding respondent States up to that date. VII. The Kantian Imperative and the Due Process of Law. 54. This leads me to another, correlated, line of reflection. The conceptualization of the human person was enhanced in the line of thinking of Emmanuel Kant, when he acknowledged that the first had an intrinsic dignity, which demands respect for oneself and in all relationships with other human beings. Each person, as a moral being (homo noumenon), subject of practical reason, is an end in themselves, thus they may never be treated as a means for the purposes of others. In his Groundworks for the Metaphysics of Moral (1785)42 E. Kant formulated his well-known imperative, according to which each person must act only according to a maxim they aspire while it becomes a universal law.43 55. Thus, the imperatives of duty of each rational being, of one with all others. Each rational being exists as an end in themselves, and never as means for others. Underlying the Kantian reasoning is the principle of the dignity inherent to each human being, which is currently present throughout the corpus juris of International Human Rights Law.44 His main concern is with regard to the protection of human dignity, in any and all situations. 56. From this we can extract some illations. First of all, the Kantian imperative is always present, when dealing with the defense and preservation of the dignity of human beings, the dignity of their own humanity. Second, it affects all spheres of human relations, both in relations of the person with agents of the public or state power, as with other human beings, with individuals.45 Third, it can be invoked in the protection of each . Works originally published in 1785, it had another three editions authorized by him (en 1786, 1792, and 1797), and it was finally offered to the public revised by him, with the summarized title The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), two years after the publication of his project for Everlasting Peace (1795). 42 . E. Kant, Fondements de la métaphysique des moeurs (1785), Paris, Libr. Delagrave, 1999, pp. 46, 103, 125-129, 136-137, 159, 164, and 166-167; I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006 [reprint], pp. 17, 183, and 209. 43 . For a study of said principle with regard to the European Convention of Human Rights, cf. B. Maurer, Le principe de respect de la dignité humaine et la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme, Paris, Éd. CERIC/Univ. d'Aix-Marseille, 1999, pp. 7491. 44 . Cf., in this sense, A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford/Florence, Academy of European Law (European University Institute)/Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 545-546. 45 16