operation of justice” (to mention a post-modern expression, which I find especially irritating). 60. We must invoke here the Kantian imperative, according to which nobody must be treated as a simple means (not even for the “operation of justice”), but instead as an end in themselves. This requires listening to them attentively in a public hearing, offering them the reasons that substantiate the judicial decision that refers to them, clarifying the doubts they may still have after said decision. Only then will the party not feel like a means (for the work of others), and they will go on to feel as an end in themselves.50 61. There are duties of justice with regard to others, characterized by a universal nature, among which we find, within the Kantian line of thought, respect (Hochachtung) for the rights of others; the obligation to respect the rights of others is imposed on each human being.51 And, as has been stated, each person has the right to know the reasons on which a judgment that refers to him or her is founded, and to participate with all freedom [of expression] in the corresponding trial. If, in the end, there is something left to clarify, there is no reason why the Tribunal would exempt itself from doing so, without this implying even the slightest modification or deference of an apparent intent to appeal, the corresponding judgment. VIII. Clarification and Substantiation. 62. Article 67 of the American Convention states that “the judgment of the Court shall be final and not subject to appeal," and that "in case of disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall interpret it at the request of any of the parties, provided the request is made within ninety days from the date of notification of the judgment.” The indication that can be concluded from Article 67 of the American Convention is that the sense or scope of the judgment must be clarified in the Interpretation of the Judgment. This is precisely what the Court did, in an exemplary manner, in its historic Interpretation of the Judgment of 09.03.2001 in the case of Barrios Altos versus Peru (para. 13), in which it clarified that, given the violation constituted by the laws of self-amnesty in the cas d'espèce, that decided by the Court in the Judgment on merits in the case of Barrios Altos had general effects (para. 18 and operative paragraph number 2). 63. Thus, the Court responded to the request for interpretation presented to the Court in the case of Barrios Altos by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, making it clear that the effects of operative paragraph 4 of the Judgment on merits (of 03.14.2001) of the Court were not only in that specific case, but also, in a generic manner, on all the cases of human rights violations in which the mentioned laws of selfamnesty had been applied. Precisely for having clarified the sense or scope of the judgment in its Interpretation of the Judgment, it had a deep impact – currently wellknown and acknowledged in the Latin American juridical circles – on the domestic legal system not only of the respondent State, but also the different States of South America. It also contributed in a valuable way to the fight against impunity. . E.L. Pincoffs, "Due Process, Fraternity, and a Kantian Injunction", in Due Process (eds. J.R. Pennock y J.W. Chapman), N.Y., N.Y. University Press, 1977, pp. 172-181. 50 . 51 E. Kant, Leçons d'éthique, op. cit. supra n. (24), p. 331. 18