23. It is also necessary to take into account that the Court must limit itself to the facts invoked in the application presented by the Inter-American Commission. It is not authorized to include, motu proprio, other facts and carry out the examination of responsibilities different to those that may correspond to the respondent State. If it were to do so, it would vary the subjective and material scope of its jurisdiction, without a regulatory foundation to do so. With regard to all other aspects, the court’s jurisprudence has constantly reiterated that the only facts to which a case and the judgment may refer are those included in the application: the contentious jurisdiction has this object and this limitation. 24. I move on to another aspect of the request for interpretation, which also generates different opinions and that must be tended to by the Inter-American Court, as has occurred. I am referring to the petition to reconsider decisions included in the judgment whose interpretation is requested. The State expressed that it wants the modification of some aspects of the judgment and that with said purpose it presents the petition we are currently analyzing. In effect, it stated that “the cornerstone of our argument (…) seeks a change in the form of compliance of some of the operative paragraphs.” Now, the forms of compliance do not constitute agreements foreign to the judgment, but instead they are part of it. With regard to this matter, it is convenient to go back to the powers of the Inter-American Court, to the nature of the judgment issued by the latter, to the nature and scope of an argument of interpretation, and to the standard jurisprudence of the tribunal regarding each and every one of these matters. 25. The Inter-American Court does not have the power to modify its judgments, in response to objections presented by the parties. The Convention does not grant it this power, nor has it created the possibility that it reform its judgments through a proceeding that could be compared to a reconsideration, appeal, or annulment. If it did so, it would exceed its powers. 26. What the Court can do with regard to the judgments issued and notified is interpret them upon request of the parties to the proceedings. This is a matter different to the objection of a judgment and its possible modification. However, interpreting does not imply alteration of the terms of the judgment. It does not imply the issuing of a new judgment, but simply the clarification or precision of the sense and scope of the decisions adopted, which remain final. The exercise of the power of interpretation assumes darkness or lack of precision in the text of a ruling, but not a step back in the examination of a matter that has already been analyzed and decided on, or withdrawal of the definitiveness that corresponds to a judgment on merits. 27. In the present case it is not necessary that the Court develop greater explanations about the sense of the words used or the meaning of the decisions adopted, which are not obscure or imprecise, but instead clear and explicit. That is probably why the request for interpretation has mentioned the desire that the Court “change” –not only interpret—certain aspects of the judgment. In the end, the Court limited itself –as expressed—“to the nature and scope of the request for interpretation pursuant to the Inter-American system, which does not suppose a new presentation of facts or juridical considerations regarding the same, additional to those presented by the parties in the dispute on merits and analyzed by the Tribunal for the purposes of the corresponding Judgment.” 28. The Court has been asked to consider certain implications of some of the aspects of the judgment in what refers to the public acknowledgment of responsibility, 5