that reasonable criteria and procedures and clear objectives should be respected and guaranteed for appointment, promotion, suspension and dismissal, and that people must not be the target of discrimination in the implementation of these procedures. 36 This was the essence of the obligation that was infringed in this case, because Mr. Aguinaga Aillón was dismissed from his position by an authority that was acting outside the bounds of its competence and using a procedure that had no legal footing. 7. This distinction is not strictly a matter of form; as I have said in previous opinions, using Convention Article 26 to hold the State responsible is legally inappropriate and undermines the legitimacy of the overall decision. Thus, holding the State of Ecuador responsible based solely on Article 23(1)(c) of the Convention not only provided a more accurate response to the facts affecting Mr. Aguinaga Aillón and allowed the Court to mark progress in its case law on the scope of the right contained in the American Convention, but also would have avoided undermining the effectiveness of the decision by overlooking the inconsistencies of direct enforcement of Convention Article 26. It is thus demonstrated once again that the use of this provision of the Convention serves only to reaffirm a line of jurisprudence on the ESCERs, regardless of whether this is relevant or necessary for the purposes of guaranteeing justice in the specific case at hand. Humberto A. Sierra Porto Judge Pablo Saavedra Alessandri Registrar 36 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 206.