“Each judge is then like a novelist in the chain. He or she must read through what other judges in the past have written not only to discover what these judges have said, or their state of mind when they said it, but to reach an opinion about what these judges have collectively done, in the way that each of our novelists formed an opinion about the collective opinion so far written.”38 35. There is therefore first an exercise of discovering and following legal principles that provide a point of continuity between the past and the present. In this ongoing work of draft a novel out of case law, every composition of the Court, inserted in specific historical circumstances and dealing with the current hermeneutical challenges presented by cases that come before it, has always done the work of interpreting the Convention so as to arrive at a protection of ESCER that is compatible with the principles of pro persona and effect utile. 36. It is true that this understanding of the Court cannot be reached without significant participation from the judges whose stances were not adopted by the majority, without prejudice to which their arguments were duly considered and added to the interpretation of the Court as counterpoints or warnings for later development of the case law. 37. Indeed, the chain novel is not a mere linear summation of opinions and decisions but the dialogic construction of an argument around a certain subject, such that the positions arrived at also contribute to the Court’s understanding, even if they were already considered and effectively rejected. 38. Thus, despite the robustness of the divergent arguments made over the course of the extensive and expert debate carried forth in this Court, a review of the early chapters of the Court’s case law unquestionably reveals a solid basis for recognizing the full and direct justiciability of ESCER through Article 26 of the treaty. In Dworkinian parlance, the Court takes ESCER seriously; it does not see them as social commitments or mere political objectives that can be set aside depending on the circumstances. 39. I would also note that some time ago, the Court consolidated the understanding that all rights require, to a certain degree, a positive application and structured public policies, both if they are worded negatively, predominantly incorporating attempts at abstention (as with civil and political rights), and if they are worded positively, in the form of requiring state action for implementation. In the end, they all depend on state resources and consistent action within the institutions and bureaucracies that states maintain at the national level to be truly effective. 40. Confirming the incompatibility of artificially dividing human rights into "categories" based on "negative" or "positive” aspects of protection (or into “generations,” referring to a supposedly chronological progression) leads to a renewed understanding that favors the aggregation of new dimensions of protection (normally provisional in nature) to what is understood as the essential core of all rights. I therefore do not think it is appropriate for objections related to the difficulty of implementing ESCER to justify vetoing their direct justiciability before this Court. The status of “immediate” and “free of charge” associated exclusively with application of civil and political rights is a mistaken idea already corrected by this Court, whose argumentative authority always depends—it is worth reiterating—on laying to rest the periodically-revived debates on the justiciability of any of the rights protected under the Convention. 38 DWORKIN, Ronald. A matter of principle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, pg. 159. 8