history he finds and not to invent a better history.”44 This is the line of reasoning I intend to follow. 60. My sense is that it is only through this incremental and minimalist approach that bows to the legal principles recognized in the past but with a view in the present on the problems at hand that the Court will become a forum for non-negotiable principles, fortified against any unstable agreement that could reduce the scope of the application of human rights to a matter contingent on the continent’s international politics. 61. The stability of the Court's case law—as well as respect for the vocabulary of human rights protection that it has enabled—is without question the greatest guarantee that human rights will not become mere optional guidelines. If states have ratified the treaty and sovereignly assented to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, its precedents become relevant guides that must be given special weight in deliberations when and if one day the question is whether to abandon them— something that does not appear to be the case with ESCER, especially following a pandemic that has imposed more suffering and inequality on one of the most unequal continents on the planet. 62. The generations of jurists who have gone before use in these chambers have clearly left a valuable legacy in the form of the body of law of the Convention, and it must be honored, not only for the quality of its argumentation but also, as has been stated elsewhere, because “liberty has no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.” III. Justiciability of ESCER in a Latin American open society of interpreters of the Convention 63. With the robustness of the Court’s settled case law on the justiciability of ESCER demonstrated, and with the arguments lined up to justify keeping it in place, it is now time to expound on what has driven me to issue this concurring opinion, with an approach placing the understanding of Article 26 of the Convention in the cognitive context of the Latin American open society of interpreters of the Convention. 64. As Peter Häberle indicates, in a lesson on constitutional hermeneutics that can be applied to the field of universal human rights, “todo aquele que vive no contexto regulado por uma norma e que vive com este contexto é, indireta ou, até mesmo diretamente, um intérprete dessa norma. O destinatário da norma é participante ativo, muito mais ativo do que se pode supor tradicionalmente, do processo hermenêutico. Como não são apenas intérpretes jurídicos da Constituição que vivem a norma, não detêm eles o monopólio da interpretação da Constituição.”45 When analyzing the interpretation and application of human rights norms by the European constitutional courts, Häberle concluded that the judicial authorities of each country were becoming true "European constitutional courts," transcending their eminently national nature and becoming active agents of the interpretation of European regional human rights law.46 44 DWORKIN, Ronald. Op. Cit. pg. 160. HÄBERLE, Peter. Hermenêutica Constitucional. A sociedade aberta dos intérpretes da Constituição: contribuição para a interpretação pluralista e procedimental da Constituição. Translation: Gilmar Ferreira Mendes. Porto Alegre. Sergio Antonio Fabris Editor, 2002. pg. 15. 45 HÄBERLE, Peter. “A Sociedade Aberta dos Intérpretes da Constituição – Considerações do Ponto de Vista Nacional-Estatal Constitucional e Regional Europeu, Bem Como sobre o Desenvolvimento do Direito Internacional,” translated by MENDES, Gilmar Ferreira, in Direito Público n°18, Oct.-Nov., 2007, pg. 73. 46 12