6 23. According to the State’s narrative, Article 202 of the Constitution adopted in Ecuador on August 10, 1998, established the principle that Supreme Court justices were not subject to limits in their term of office, along with the cooptation system for filling any vacancies that arose. Thus, the National Congress, pursuant to its constitutional and legal powers, interpreted Transitory Provision No. 25 of the Constitution and, in a resolution of December 8, 2004, decided to terminate the justices of the Supreme Court in their positions, on the grounds that “the tenure in office of those justices had concluded in January 2003, and so, by December 2004, they were exercising their duties under an expired mandate.” 24. The State submits that the “Ecuadorian Constitution of 1998 stipulates that judges of the judicial branch shall not be subject to a fixed term of office, and that said constitutional provision is not retroactive, but is applicable in the future.” In the State’s view, the petitioners were appointed one year earlier and so are not entitled to invoke that rule. 25. The State stresses that an international agency is not empowered to examine the legislature’s interpretation of constitutional precepts dealing the organization and functioning of a state’s political bodies, since were it to do so, it would be acting as a fourth instance. 26. Specifically, as regards the rights enshrined in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, the State submits that the petitioners are confusing removal and dismissal from a position with termination. The State refers to the “political origin of the appointment of the Supreme Court justices,” which did not involve a public competition. In the State’s view, the petitioners’ arguments recognizing the National Congress as the authority responsible for nominations and failing to recognize it as the “agency responsible for constitutional interpretations and for terminating the duties of former justices” are contradictory. 27. The State holds that a removal or dismissal must ensure due process in order to establish and prove the commission of the offense for which a public official is sanctioned. The case at hand, according to the State, is neither a removal or a dismissal; instead, “albeit somewhat tardily, the termination mechanism was simply enforced,” a mechanism that can occur following a voluntary resignation or when, with the passage of time, the official’s functions come to an end. It submits that in such circumstances, it is not necessary to begin proceedings, nor do the right of defense and the guarantees of a natural judge, impartiality, and legality apply, since the petitioners were not accused of any offense constituting grounds for dismissal. 28. It adds that the justices did not have to be given “prior notification in detail of the proceedings or charges made against them, because there simply were none.” In the State’s words, “termination (…) represents no punishment, either administrative, political, or civil, and much less criminal. Consequently, it is unacceptable to claim a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.” 29. The State contends that even if the alleged victims’ rights had been violated “no mechanism for domestic civil or administrative redress has been invoked, since the petitioners have not taken their case to the courts.” In the State’s view, if the petitioners did not file for remedies with the Ecuadorian courts, then no violation of Article 25 of the American Convention can be alleged. 30. Finally, the State submits that the facts set out do not establish violations of the rights enshrined in Articles 23 and 24 of the American Convention.