IX REPARATIONS 124. On the basis of Article 63(1) of the Convention, the Court has indicated that any violation of an international obligation that has caused harm entails the duty to make adequate reparation and that this provision reflects a customary norm that constitutes one of the fundamental principles of contemporary international law on State responsibility.101 125. Reparation for the harm caused by the infringement of an international obligation requires, to the extent possible, full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which consists in the restoration of the prior situation. If this is not possible, as occurs in most cases of human rights violations, the Court will determine measures to guarantee the infringed rights and to redress the consequences of the violations.102 126. International case law and, in particular, that of the Court have repeatedly established that this judgment is, per se, a form of reparation.103 Nevertheless, in view of the circumstances of this case and the harm that the violations caused to the victims, the Court finds it pertinent to decree other measures. A. Injured Party 127. The Court reiterates that, pursuant to Article 63(1) of the Convention, it considers an injured party to be anyone who has been declared a victim of a violation of a right recognized in the Convention. Therefore, the Court considers as the injured parties the 184 persons listed in Annex 1 of this judgment, who as victims of the violations declared in Chapters VVV-1, VIII-2 and VIII-3 are the beneficiaries of the following orders of the Court. B. Prior considerations in the matter of reparations B.1 Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 128. The Commission maintained that, in the area of reparations, this case should follow what was resolved in Canales Huapaya et al. v. Peru and in Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.) v. Peru. Therefore, it referred to the “the propriety of directly establishing appropriate reparations in the context of its recommendations, without resorting to mechanisms at the domestic level that might delay obtaining that reparation even more.” 129. The representatives did not present arguments on this matter. 130. The State argued that the standards of reparation established in Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.) v. Peru, in Canales Huapaya et al. v. Peru and Dismissed Employees of Petroperú et al. v. Peru “had notable differences” with this case. It pointed out that Special, Multisectoral and Executive Commissions were created in the domestic order to evaluate the dismissals of the congressional employees. In addition, Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No. 7, para. 25 and Case of Deras García et al. v. Honduras, supra, para. 90. 101 Cf.. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and Costs, supra, para. 26 and Case of Deras García et al. v. Honduras, supra, para. 91. 102 Cf. Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 19, 1996. Series C No. 29, para. 56 and Case of López et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2019. Series C No. 396, para. 233. 103 34