34. On June 11, 1998, the Division declared the application inadmissible, saying that the “mere fact that proceedings have been instituted” did not amount to an injury.”46 5. Remedies Attempted by Judge Colindres after His Dismissal on July 2, 1998 35. On July 15, 1998, Mr. Colindres filed another amparo application (No. 231-98) with the Constitutional Division against Decree 348, by which he was dismissed. Among other things, the application argued that the Assembly lacked authority to remove him from office,47 that he was not given any real opportunity to exercise his right to defend himself owing to the irregularities committed by the Special Committee,48 and that one of the grounds invoked for his dismissal was “disobedience” (desacato).49 On January 11, 1999, the “Court Prosecutor” presented a brief which argued that the Special Committee lacked jurisdiction to examine the case.50 The brief held that parliamentary special committees lack competence to ensure the right to a hearing because their express power, granted by Article 131 (32) of the Constitution, is to investigate “matters of national interest.” The brief states that Article 861 of the Constitution provides that government officials only have those powers that are expressly accorded to them by the law and not those that are arbitrarily attributed to them.51 36. On May 4, 1999, by a majority vote, the Constitutional Division adopted a ruling declaring the application “unfounded.” The Division reiterated that neither the Constitution nor the Electoral Code determined which was the competent authority to remove a judge of the TSE.52 However, “it is reasonable to surmise that said power resides with the organ that decided the appointment.” It also rejected Mr. Colindres’ argument that he had been tried twice on the same charges.53 46Ruling of inadmissibility on amparo application No. 147-98, June 11, 1998. Annex 17 to the petitioner's initial petition of May 4, 2000 (received on that same date). 47On this point, Mr. Colindres said that Article 131 (37) of the Constitution enshrines the powers of the Legislative Assembly, while Article 131 (38) authorizes it to “exercise the other powers indicated by the Constitution.” He said that “no provision” of the Constitution gives the Assembly the power to remove or dismiss TSE judges. Mr. Colindres said that the right to appoint does not in and of itself give the Assembly the right to dismiss, and that proof of that were the cases of the Prosecutor General of the Republic, the Procurator General of the Republic, and the National Judiciary Council, in which the Constitution had to be reformed in order to give the Assembly that power. Initial amparo application No. 231-98, April 15, 1998, p. 4, Annex 19 to the petitioner's initial petition of May 4, 2000 (received on that same date). 48Mr. Colindres said that for a right to be deprived there had to be due process and respect for the right to a hearing, which had not been ensured in his case because the Special Committee lacked jurisdiction and because of the fact that it had concealed evidence by informing the plenary on May 21 that it had not yet received the report of the TSE, in spite of the fact that said tribunal had already sent that information. Mr. Colindres also mentioned as another irregularity that the Special Committee presented its report on May 21, 1998, to the plenary of the Legislative Assembly, and the Speaker of the Assembly decided on his own to forward it to the Political Committee. Mr. Colindres said that the Political Committee also concealed evidence that he had submitted, since it did not present to the legislative plenary the brief of May 26, 1998, by which Mr. Colindres denounced the violations of which he considered himself a victim. Initial amparo application No. 231-98, April 15, 1998, p. 7, Annex 19 to the petitioner's initial petition of May 4, 2000 (received on that same date). 49Mr. Colindres said that in the “piece of correspondence” that served as the basis for his removal from office he was accused of disobedience as a new cause for dismissal, which is an offense that, under Article 236 of the Constitution required the institution of a preliminary proceeding against him, which did not occur. Initial amparo application No. 231 231-98, July 15, 1998, Annex 19 to the petitioner's initial petition of May 4, 2000 (received on that same date). 50Brief presented by the court prosecutor stating that the Special Committee lacked jurisdiction, dated January 11, 1999. Annex 20 to the petitioner's initial petition of May 4, 2000 (received on that same date). 51Brief presented by the court prosecutor stating that the Special Committee lacked jurisdiction, dated January 11, 1999. Annex 20 to the petitioner's initial petition of May 4, 2000 (received on that same date). 52Ruling of the Constitutional Division of the Supreme Court declaring amparo application No. 231-98 unfounded, p. 20, Annex 21 to the petitioner's initial petition of May 4, 2000 (received on that same date) and enclosed with the State’s brief of November 14, 2000 (received on November 22, 2000). 53Ruling of the Constitutional Division of the Supreme Court declaring amparo application 231-98 unfounded, pp. 34 and 35. Annex 21 to the petitioner's initial petition of May 4, 2000 (received on that same date). 9