B. The State 25. The State indicates that impeachment is a constitutional procedure established to adjudge Supreme Court Justices and that therefore it cannot be categorized as a special tribunal. The State indicates that the Justices are tried publicly and afforded all procedural guarantees, including the right to defend themselves. 26. The State explains that poor performance of one’s duties must necessarily be investigated according to a procedure established in the Rules of Procedure issued for the aforementioned impeachment trial. The State affirms that it fulfilled its obligation to investigate and rule on the serious errors, omissions, acts of negligence, and misdemeanors of its agents. 27. The State also affirms that through its representatives in the respective legislative chamber, it acted on behalf of both sides in the impeachment trial by overseeing the defense of the Justices on trial and allowing them the opportunity to present their material defense. The State assures that the trial was conducted in compliance with the National Constitution, and indicates that this case required shorter time periods in the interest of the common good, and that it was not arbitrary, but rather very objective, in determining the veracity of the facts. The State emphasizes that in an impeachment trial guilt is not determined in the same way as in an oral, public trial, but rather one judges the degree of suspicion which may hinder the trustworthiness of the high-ranking official. 28. The State affirms that the removal of Justice Carlos Fernández Gadea was done on the grounds that a public official under investigation for poor performance cannot serve on the Supreme Court, a post which, as is stated in the Paraguayan Constitution, must be held by persons of impeccable and unquestionable conduct. The State asserts that “even the most minor questioning of his conduct, in any regard, renders him incapable of serving in that post.” Therefore, since there was suspicion as to the petitioner’s performance as a Supreme Court Justice, he had to be removed from the post. 29. The State reports that only the legislators, in their individual capacity, can state why certain judicial rulings served as grounds for removing the petitioner from his post. The State adds, “the State cannot be responsible for the actions or omissions of State agents. [...] If in the performance of his duties a public official acts with due diligence and causes harm to a third party, the States assumes liability. However, if a public official is intentionally negligent, exploiting his capacity as a State agent to harm others through the commission of punishable acts, then we cannot speak of State liability. In this case, the public official is personally liable.” The State indicates that it cannot “answer these questions; only the protagonists in the impeachment trial can do that.” Thus the State concludes that the Paraguayan Constitution establishes the principle of secondary liability of the State, which implies that “if there were any error on the part of the legislators conducting the impeachment trial, Mr. Carlos Fernández Gadea must direct his legal action against those individuals, and not the State, as he is seeking to do here.” 30. The State alleges that the remedies available within domestic jurisdiction have not been exhausted, and that before filing a case against the State, the petitioner should have made use of remedies to determine the liability of the State agents. “If liability for an illegal act is not established, one cannot establish the right to receive compensation for damages which have not been proven in court. If liability is not determined for any public officials, the State has no passive legal standing to respond to something that does not exist.” The State notes that liability of public officials sued by a private citizen must be 6