streamline staffing pursuant to Decree-Law No. 26120 mentioned above. The petitioners alleged that this resulted in the implementation ultra activa, to the workers’ detriment, of a regulation that had already been repealed, violating the principle of freedom from ex post facto laws established in the American Convention. 14. The petitioners also maintain that the procedure set forth under Decree-Law No. 26120 violated their right to due process by establishing a procedure that did not provide for the possibility of challenging the resolution of the administrative authority ordering the dismissal. Instead it stipulated that the administrative labor authority simply approve the collective dismissal of the workers without informing the other party, in opposition of the provisions of Article 82 of the Job Training and Promotion Act. The petitioners alleged that through these actions the principle of equal treatment was violated, inter alia, by “not providing this group of workers the right to a defense or to challenge a decision by the administrative authority”. 15. With respect to the requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted, the petitioners said that on January 31, 1996 they lodged an remedy of amparo alleging the violation of their right to work, right to equal protection, right to equal opportunity, right to nondiscrimination, right to protection against arbitrary dismissal, and right to due process. On December 6, 1996, the First Civil Court in Callao ruled that the amparo was groundless. According to the information provided by the petitioners, the Court based that decision on the argument that the employer had strictly enforced the law; moreover, it maintained that there were special courts for processing and resolving labor-related cases. The Civil Chamber of the Callao Superior Court upheld that decision in a judgment handed down on March 18, 1997. The petitioners claim that they then filed an extraordinary appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal, which eventually upheld the decision of the two lower courts through a judgment dated March 3, 1998. 16. The petitioners also maintain that since 2001 the State had recognized its responsibility for the facts of this case. They argue, however, that the State’s recognition of its responsibility had not translated into actual reparations for the rights violated. Thus, the petitioners say that the January 2, 2002 Final Report of the Special Commission on Collective Dismissals, mandated by Law No. 27452 and chaired by the Ministry of Labor, stated the following: The procedure […] set forth in Article 47 of Decree-Law No. 26120, as well as all decree-laws containing that same procedure, violated the right to due process, by failing to allow for the workers to exercise their right to contest and right of defense. It also violated other constitutional rights, such as right to information and to nondiscrimination […]. 17. According to the petitioners, this recognition of responsibility was reiterated through Law No. 27803 of July 29, 2002, which was enacted to resolve the irregularities in collective dismissals by the government. They allege that, in fulfillment of that law, on October 15, 2002, the Deputy Minister of Transportation and Communications recognized, through letter 767-2002-MTC/15.02, that the petitioners were dismissed irregularly. Consequently, the 25 petitioners were included in the Second List of Workers Dismissed Irregularly, published on March 27, 2003. As a result 4