V THE META-JURIDICAL ASPECT OF THE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE JUDGMENT 12. I have left the treatment of the State’s request regarding the fact that the Court did not offer greater details in its consideration on the phenomenon of terrorism, which it has done in other cases submitted to its decision by the Inter-American Commission with regard to several States,4 to the possibility that an “obiter dictum” has been issued in this sense within the text of the judgment, based on the Court’s working conditions, which to solve cases of the magnitude of the present case and many others has four sessions of two weeks each. 13. In a two-week session the Court usually issues four or five judgments, holds public hearings, issues orders on provisional measures and the processing of cases and other important matters, which forces it to work against the clock in work sessions that end up exhausting the Judges and the Secretariat’s personnel. And during those eight weeks a year, the Court deliberates, mainly because the reading of the dossiers and the preparation of the judgments by the rapporteur judges and legal teams and interns of the Secretariat is done outside those sessions, when the activities to which each Judge is dedicated allow it. If the work conditions of the Judges were different, it would be possible to issue judgments to which more time could be dedicated and they could offer greater detail with regard to determinations considered important by the State Parties. It is an obligation of the State Parties to guarantee that the Court can meet a period of time sufficient enough to appropriately consider the cases.5 14. With the reformed rules of procedure, of the Court and the Commission, which came into force in the year 2001, the number of cases submitted to the consideration of the Court by the Commission has more than duplicated, and the Organization of American States (OAS) funds the same eight weeks of sessions per year, which has led the Court to receive in public hearings only the most important testimonies and expert statements, ordering the receipt of the rest through sworn statements (affidavits), and it has decreased the time of deliberation for every case. Cfr. Case of Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166; Case of Goiburu et al. v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 22, 2006. Series C No. 153; Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33; Case of Castillo Páez v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of November 3, 1997. Series C No. 34; Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52; and Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C No. 69. 4 Cfr. “La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: Camino Hacia un Tribunal Permanente” and “La Corte Interamericana de Derechos: La Necesidad Inmediata de Convertirse en un Tribunal Permanente (Efectos de la Aplicación del Cuarto Reglamento de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, de Junio de 2001 a Junio de 2004, en Relación con el Artículo 44.1 del Reglamento de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos” In: Trindade, Antônio Augusto Cançado; Ventura Robles, Manuel E. “El Futuro de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos”. Corte IDH-ACNUR, 3a Edición, San José, Costa Rica, 2005. 5 4