127. Regarding the protection of the area and the AMIA building, the IACHR notes that the State did not have effective mechanisms to confront and repel risky situations that could arise. There is no record in the file before the IACHR that security deployments, control of traffic of people, or of transportation were properly coordinated, nor of security protocols on the outskirts and inside the building, in the event of a possible violent event, or, measures to strengthen the infrastructure and protect the life and integrity of the people who were in it. 128. The Commission observes that the only measure adopted consisting of police surveillance was seriously flawed. As confirmed by TOF 3, the AMIA building had 24-hour surveillance, in charge of the 5th and 7th Police Stations of the Argentine Federal Police. The custody planned for the building implied that two people had to be permanently monitoring the building, however, according to internal evidence, the police personnel did not have the equipment initially available to fulfill their function, so they used an internal custody manual communications apparatus. The Commission observes that the failure in the custody equipment had been occurring for some time and the absence of a battery for the communications equipment was not an exceptional issue that coincided on the day the attack occurred, as according to the TOF 3 "at least from Friday the 15th until the morning of the following Monday, the [communication equipment of the] patrol car stationed on Pasteur Street was not working because its battery had no charge." 129. On the other hand, with regard to control in the area, the Commission observes that the State has not proven that effective measures were adopted to control and requisition the entry of automobiles to Pasteur Street. According to TOF 3 “the inspection of the materials destined for the repair tasks and that of the dump trucks that were located in front of the mutual door was in charge of its security personnel and, according to the different statements of the police personnel , there was no coordination between the external security in charge of the Federal Police and the internal security of the building”89. 130. Finally, in relation to the State's response to the alerts that were presented prior to the attack and that illustrate the immediacy of the risk, the Commission observes that the State did not inquire about the information that the Brazilian citizen Wilson Dos Santos gave to the Argentine consul in Milan. In this regard, the TOF 3 ruling concluded “although not enough elements of conviction have been gathered to authorize the claim that Wilson Roberto Dos Santos alerted what would happen on July 18, 1994, sent by a foreign intelligence agency, the circumstances and supposed motivations, surrounding the activity of said man in the different consular offices he attended, should be considered highly striking”90. 131. The Commission also observes that the State did not report having adopted measures in relation to the helicopter that flew over the AMIA building the night before the attack. As TOF 3 pointed out, “[s]aid evidence deficit, which hampered the possibility of deepening the circumstances that would explain such a singular event -a hover over the mutual, for a few minutes, the night before the attack- and about which they wove numerous hypotheses, never confirmed, constituted an inadmissible disregard of the examining judge, since he failed to request, in a timely manner and in the adequate way, those data that would have shed light on the question; especially when the suspicious presence was announced to the intervening court on the same day of the attack, later corroborated by the first testimonies presented in the process”91. The Commission considers that, in effect, the State committed an omission by not adopting measures to clarify the facts about the flight of a helicopter, the reasons for it, and in any case, increasing the security measures and custody of the place, in order for them to be effective to avoid the risk that was latent on the site. There is not even record of this occurrence. Although there should have been annotations about extraordinary events in the street, it is striking that there was no alarm for an event such as the presence of an artifact in the air. 132. Although the Commission does not affirm that these facts were necessarily going to be decisive in preventing the attack on Pasteur Street, it emphasizes that the duty of prevention is of means and not of result, Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter V, p. 2356. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter XIV, p. 4596. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 91 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter VI, p. 2650. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 89 90 25