24 A. Background 76. The State of Guatemala experienced an internal armed conflict between 1962 and 1996 that caused great human, material, institutional and moral costs. 52 A peace process began in 1990 and culminated in December 1996, when the Government of the Republic of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), with the participation of civil society, signed the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace, with the aim of ending the armed conflict. This Agreement gives validity to the twelve agreements signed during previous negotiations, among them, one for the creation of the Commission for Historical Clarification (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico, hereinafter “CEH”) “of the human rights violations and the acts of violence that have caused suffering to the Guatemalan population.” The Commission began its work on July 31, 1997, and published its Report “Guatemala, Memoria del Silencio” (“Guatemala, Memory of Silence”) on February 25, 1999. 53 77. In the context of the internal armed conflict in Guatemala, the State applied the so-called “National Security Doctrine,” a central tenet of which was the notion of an “enemy within.” Initially, this included the guerilla organizations but was later expanded to include “all those persons who identified with the communist ideology or who belonged to any organization – trade union, social, religious, student - or those that for any reason were not in favor of the established regime.” 54 In application of this doctrine, 91% of the reported violations occurred under the dictatorships of Generals Romeo Lucas García (1978-1982) and José Efraín Ríos Montt (19821983). 55 Based on this doctrine, the Guatemalan army identified members of the Maya indigenous people as the “enemy within,” considering that they constituted, or could constitute, the social base of the guerrillas. 56 According to the CEH, in ethnic terms, “83.3% of the victims of human rights violations and acts of violence recorded by [it] belonged to a Mayan ethnic group, 16.5% belonged to the Ladino group and 0.2% to other groups.” 57 In this regard, it explained that “in most cases, the identification between the Maya communities and the insurgency was intentionally exaggerated by the State which, relying on traditional racist prejudices, used this identification to eliminate any present and future possibilities for the population to provide assistance or join any insurgent initiative.” Thus, “the undeniable reality of racism as a doctrine of superiority permanently expressed by the State was a fundamental factor in explaining the particularly brutal and indiscriminate nature of the military operations carried out against hundreds of Maya communities […], particularly between 1981 and 1983.” 58 78. In April 1982, the governing Military Junta presided by José Efraín Ríos Montt launched the “National Security and Development Plan,” which established national objectives in military, administrative, legal, social, economic and political terms. This Plan identified the main conflict areas in the different departments of the country. 59 The Military Junta and the Military High 52 Cf. Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of April 29, 2004. Series C No. 105, para. 42.1, and Case of García and Family Members v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 29, 2012. Series C No. 258, para. 51. 53 Cf. Case of Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2003. Series C No. 101, para. 134.9, and Case of García and Family Members v. Guatemala, para. 55. 54 Cf. Case of Gudiel Álvarez et al. v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2012. Series C No. 253, para. 54, and Case of García and Family Members v. Guatemala, para. 51. 55 Cf. Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits, paras. 42.3 and 42.4, and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 4, 2012. Series C No. 250, para. 57. 56 Cf. Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 42.7, and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, para. 58. 57 Cf. Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2008. Series C No. 190, para. 48, and Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 25, 2010. Series C No. 212, para. 66. 58 Cf. Report of the CEH “Guatemala, Memory of Silence”, Chapter 4, paras. 31 and 33. 59 Cf. Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, para. 65, and Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre. Merits, paras. 42.3 to 42.4.