44 137. In the present case, the information available indicates that the Judicial Branch, in the form of the SCJ, had a clear and public position in favor of the legality of the events associated with the coup d’état, a position that was patently at variance with the interest manifested by the judges and magistrates who, through various acts and statements, came out in opposition to the coup d’état. 138. The position of the SCJ, calculated to validate the coup d’état, is confirmed by the following: i) it was a protagonist in the ouster process of José Manuel Zelaya and the consummation of the coup; ii) it issued a series of press releases in which it underscored the alleged legality of the events associated with the apprehension of President Zelaya; iii) it held meetings with the de facto President concerning decrees he issued, and iv) it denied all the petitions of amparo filed against actions on the part of the de facto government and acted swiftly to grant amparo relief to those who claimed to have been adversely affected by President Zelaya’s actions. 139. The Commission therefore considers that the SCJ does not pass the objectivity test of impartiality to pass judgment on the alleged victims in the instant case, whose interests were patently at odds with the interests the Court was serving. 140. Furthermore, the Commission notes that the alleged victims had no opportunity to challenge the impartiality of the members of the SCJ, since the case on the disciplinary investigation went directly to the Supreme Court from the Office of Personnel Management, which had recommended their dismissal. The Court then proceeded to make its decision without following trial procedure; as a result, the alleged victims were never given a procedural opportunity to challenge the Supreme Court’s lack of impartiality. Here, the Inter-American Court has held that the right to challenge judges serves a twofold purpose: on one hand, it works as a guarantee for the parties to the proceedings, and on the other hand, it seeks to lend credibility to the role performed by the court.227 As the Court wrote: through challenging, the parties are given the right to move for the exclusion of a judge when, regardless of the personal conduct observed by the questioned judge, there are facts that can be proven or elements of conviction that may not warrant elimination of grounds for misgivings or legitimate suspicions of partiality regarding his person, thus preventing his decision from being seen as made by reasons alien to the Law and, therefore, the operation of the Judicial System to appear distorted. Challenging should not necessarily be seen as putting on trial the moral rectitude of the challenged official, but rather as a tool to build trust in those turning to the State in quest for action by bodies that are and appear to be impartial.228 141. The Commission therefore concludes that in the present case, the SCJ violated the principle of impartiality in two respects: both through the Court’s involvement without the necessary objective guarantees of impartiality, and through the impediment that made it impossible to bring a challenge to guarantee this right. 227 I/A Court H.R. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No 182, Paragraph 63. 228 I/A Court H.R. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No 182, Paragraph 63.