72 243. For all the foregoing reasons, the Commission concludes that the Honduran State is responsible for violating the rights to freedom of thought and expression and assembly, recognized in articles 9, 13 and 15 of the American Convention, read in conjunction with the obligations established in articles 1(1) and 2 thereof and to the detriment of Adán Guillermo López Lone. b. Luis Alfonso Chévez de la Rocha 244. The established facts show that on August 13, 2009, disciplinary proceedings were instituted against Judge Luis Chévez de la Rocha because of his alleged participation in a public demonstration in the city of San Pedro Sula, where he was allegedly “disturbing the peace” and because he was deemed to have been “disrespectful of the employees […] and inciting them to protest what he regards as a de facto government.” 245. Almost a year after the disciplinary case first started, on May 5, 2010 the SCJ decided to dismiss Judge Chévez de la Rocha. In arriving at its decision, the SCJ observed that the judge was arrested “for disturbing the peace” and that judges may not engage in partisan political activities of any kind or under any circumstances under Article 319 of the Constitution and Article 3(6) of the Law on the Organization, Functions and Authorities of the Courts, which provides that judicial authorities, among others, shall not “take part in political meetings, demonstrations or other acts, although the rest of the citizenry may take part in those activities.” The witnesses in the disciplinary proceedings claimed that Judge Chévez had made to other members of the Judicial Branch, their contention was that he had “incited judicial employees to join the demonstrations for Mr. José Manuel Zelaya Rosales”, that Judge Chévez had said that he was ashamed of “how the [SCJ] had allowed itself to be used” in connection with the events of June 28 and that he participated in “those movements staged to protest the current Constitutional Government.” The Supreme Court held that the judge had “provoked altercations” and stated that Article 53(b) of the Judicial Career Service Act and the Code of Ethics for Judicial Officials and Employees prohibit officials of the Judiciary from making “slanderous or defamatory statements against the institutions or against any public servant or public official. 246. The IACHR observes that the Judicial Career Council subsequently reversed the SCJ’s decision finding Judge Chévez de la Rocha at fault. On the one hand it found that the judge’s participation in the events that disrupted public order had not been proven and that his arrest during the demonstration had been unlawful. It did, however, state that the proceedings had shown that the alleged victim’s conduct toward his colleagues was “unbecoming his office as a judge, as he engaged in acts inimical to the administration of justice […] by making slanderous or defamatory statements against the institutions or against a public servant or public official; it has also been shown that he was derelict [in his duty] to act with respect and equanimity.” Nevertheless, applying the principle of proportionality, the Council was of the view that it should only order “a fine or that he be suspended, but not that he be dismissed, which is the ultimate punishment.” 247. Despite its findings, the Judicial Career Council decided to deny the alleged victim’s request to be reinstated in his office since in its view, “the evidence demonstrates that Judge [Chévez de la Rocha] is ashamed of belonging to the Judicial Branch and works there out of need; hence, given his expressions of dissent, it is not in either party’s best interests to leave the employment relationship intact.” The IACHR notes that Judge Chévez received the compensation that he was entitled to receive by law.