29. It maintains that since the preconditions required for allowing said appeal did not exist, given that the complainant was requesting clarifications of matters that were clearly expressed in Article 31 of Law No. 1084/97,4 of April 22, 2003, the JEM decided not to grant the petitions for clarification and reversal. 30. It points out the petitioner brought an action of unconstitutionality against said decision, which was heard on April 25 of the same year and rejected on June 16, 2004, by the CSJ. 31. It claims that the petitioner was accused of poor performance of his duties by the body that judges the conduct of magistrates and prosecutors and that “each and every one of the appropriate procedural stages” was implemented during that proceeding. It argues that the petitioner used “the procedural devices provided by law to appeal each and every one of the decisions” of the JEM that were unfavorable to him, and therefore that the rules of due process had been complied with. The State argues that the fact that the judgment went against the petitioner does not mean that the decision was arbitrary or illegal. It adds that the vote of the CSJ sitting en banc (nine members) was unanimous. 32. In response to the petitioner’s allegation regarding non-payment of lost earnings given his acquittal in the second proceeding (see III A supra), the State replies that domestic legislation provides the administrative litigation process for him to request reversal of an administrative decision he considers detrimental to his rights. It indicates that payment of said salaries depends on an administrative decision that so provides. It alleges that the petitioner can also initiate of process for compensation for damages. 33. Likewise, the State disputes the petitioner’s allegation regarding the political situation and institutional crisis in the country as the supposed cause of the decisions rendered by the Civil and Commercial Courts of First Instance to reject the preliminary observations presented by the petitioner in the proceedings for compensation for the damages against him (see III A supra). 34. In addition, as concerns the petitioner’s allegation concerning a double ruling on the part of the State (see III A supra), it responds that the State’s official observations were set out in the Report of the FGE that the Public Prosecutor’s Office presented to the IACHR. 35. The State contends that the petitioner cannot use the IACHR as a judicial instance of last resort to try to reverse court decisions in proceedings in which he participated fully—decisions that are final and enforceable. IV. ANALYSIS A. Competence of the Commission ratione personae, ratione loci, ratione temporis, and ratione materiae 36. The petitioner is entitled to lodge a petition with the Commission under Article 44 of the American Convention and Article 23 of its Rules of Procedure. The petition identifies as the alleged victim an individual for whom the State has pledged to respect and ensure the rights recognized in the American Convention since August 24, 1989, the date on which Paraguay deposited its instrument of ratification. Therefore, the Commission is competent ratione personae to examine the petition. 37. The Commission is competent ratione loci to consider the petition, inasmuch as the facts therein are alleged to have taken place in a State party to the American Convention. The Commission is also Article 31.- The Jury shall render a final judgment within a period of 30 days from the time the procedural decisions are enforceable and within 180 days from the start of the proceeding. 4 The Jury’s decision may consist of only removal or acquittal of the accused. In the case of removal, said decision shall be communicated to the Chambers of Congress, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Council of Magistrates. The Jury shall decide on the costs of the proceeding.