3 the question was only brought up by the Government of Peru in an advanced stage of the proceedings before the Commission4, in the period of the consideration of the preparation of the Commission’s Report on the case5 (above mentioned document), beyond the time limit (and not in limine litis ), and, even so, not as a preliminary objection of admissibility proper but rather as de facto information on proceedings pending in the domestic jurisdiction.6 12. The act of pointing out, as a fact and in an extemporaneous manner, the existence of judicial proceedings pending in the domestic courts is not the same as expressly objecting to, on the basis of this fact, the admissibility and examination of the case by the Commission on the international level. Moreover, as the present judgment rightly sets forth, there is no way to prolong indefinitely in time the opportunity granted to the respondent Government to raise a preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, which exists primarily for its benefit at the stage of admissibility of the petition. 13. The decision of the Commission regarding the admissibility should be considered definitive, impeding the Government to reopen it, and the Court to review it, since, in the present case, the preliminary objection in question was not even raised by the respondent Government in due time (in limine litis) for the decision of the Commission. This basis alone is sufficient to reject the preliminary objection interposed by the respondent Government. Given the circumstances of the present case of Castillo Páez, the objection (of the same content) of the alleged non-exhaustion of domestic remedies should be rejected on the basis of its extemporaneous nature and the tacit waiver before the Commission, and the estoppel (forclusion) before the Court7. 14. The rationale of my position, such as I have manifested it in the work of the Court,8 ultimately lays in the aim of assuring the necessary balance or procedural equality of the parties before the Court -that is, between the petitioning plaintiffs and the respondent governments- essential to all jurisdictional systems of international protection of human rights. Without the locus standi in judicio of both parties9 any system of protection finds 4 5 Hearing of 16 September 1994, before the Commission. The previous writing of the Government of 3 October 1991, limited itself to transmitting to the Commission information on investigations carried out on the national level on the Castillo Páez case. 6 The Government only raised the preliminary objection as such before the Commission in its writing of 3 January 1995 (Report prepared by a Working Group) when the Commission’s Report containing its decision on the case had already been adopted. 7 Under the European Convention on Human Rights, according to the jurisprudence constante of the European Court of Human Rights, the respondent Government who failed to raise an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies previously before the Commission, is prevented from raising it before the Court (estoppel). The European Court has ruled to this effect, inter alia, in the cases of Artico (1980), Corigliano (1982), Foti (1982) and Ciulla (1989), concerning Italy; Granger (1990), concerning the United Kingdom; Bozano (1986), concerning France; De Jong, Blajet and Van der Brink (1984), concerning Holland; and Bricmont (1989), concerning Belgium. In its Judgment of 22 May 1984, in the Van der Sluijs, Zuiderveld and Klappe case, concerning Holland, the European Court went even further. In that case, the respondent Government had initially raised an objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies before the European Commission, but failed to mention it in its "preliminary" arguments (hearing of November 1983) before the European Court. The delegate of the Commission deduced, in his reply, that the respondent Government appeared no longer to insist upon that objection. Since the Government did not question the Commission’s analysis, the Court took formal notice of the Government’s "withdrawal" of the objection of non-exhaustion, thus putting an end to the question (Judgment cit. supra, paragraphs 38-39 and 52). 8 E.g., in the public hearing of the Court of 17 January 1996, in the El Amparo case, concerning Venezuela. 9 It cannot go unnoticed that the question of locus standi in judicio of individuals before the Court (in cases already submitted to it by the Commission) is distinct from the right to submit a concrete case for decision by the Court, which Article 61(1) of the American Convention currently reserves only to the Commission and the States Parties to the Convention.