and administrative rulings issued by the competent domestic authorities does not entitle the IACHR to review said judgments. 9. In addition, concerning the alleged violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, it asserts that the difference between the unfavorable rulings in the judicial and administrative courts lies in the arguments given, which does not constitute a violation of the procedural safeguards recognized in the Convention, nor a purported infringement of the principle of prohibition of reformatio in peius because the judgment was still unfavorable. It claims that, in any case, the purported procedural error invoked was amended through the resolution of June 14, 2010, in which the claim of the child’s best interest was dismissed and which was based on the evidence of the act of discrimination. It also indicates that the jurisdictional body is unable to include ex officio new evidence declared inadmissible by the administrative-law court; for the alleged victim had the opportunity to include and request evidence that he deemed necessary to support his complaint before INDECOPI. In addition, as to the purported violation of reasonable period, it asserts that the duration of the proceedings was due to the parties’ procedural activity. 10. Likewise, with regard to the purported violation of Article 24 of the Convention, it indicates that the claim is not connected with the right to equal protection, since under Legislative Decree No. 716 the norms concerning the burden of proof rule the possibility that the claimant proves the act of discrimination by presenting circumstantial evidence. It asserts, therefore, that the “standard of circumstantial evidence” applied by the domestic authorities was not discriminatory, and that it was the lack of evidence of the alleged act of discrimination what motivated the court to declare the complaint groundless. It affirms that what the petitioners actually challenge concerns the opportunity to produce evidence and the assessment criteria applied, resorting to the IACHR as a fourth instance. In addition, states that the non-application of the Article 7.b of Legislative Decree No. 716 was not brought to the attention of judicial and administrative-law bodies by alleged victim. Moreover, it indicates that the principle of the child’s best interest was part of the aspects discussed in the administrative proceedings, which entitled the judicial body to rule on said matter; but that the Second Chamber’s main argument to declaring the complaint groundless was the lack of elements to irrefutably prove the act of discrimination and that, in any case, the Chamber did not discriminate on the basis of the sexual orientation of couples showing excessive romantic behavior. VI. EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES AND TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION 11. The petitioners claim that the alleged victim has exhausted the domestic remedies foreseen in the Peruvian legal framework, in the judicial and administrative-law courts. For its part, the State alleges lack of exhaustion of domestic remedies in regard to the claims concerning Articles 11 and 13 of the Convention, and it indicates that the alleged victim could have filed an appeal for legal protection, which he failed to pursue. In this regard, the IACHR notes that the remedies that the alleged victim exhausted in the domestic jurisdiction were appropriate for the purpose of the claims submitted. In addition, with respect to the State’s claim that INDECOPI was not competent to assess the purported infringement of the right to the protection of one’s honor and dignity because it is not a right recognized to consumers, the Commission believes that the substance of the matter presented in the instant petition was brought to the attention of judicial and administrative-law bodies, and that the competent authorities examined it and ruled on it without having, in view of their competence, limited or partially excluded the presented matter. In this regard, it is understood that the purported infringement of the rights enshrined in said rules appear to have been the result of the act of discrimination presented in the filed proceedings. In view of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the alleged victim’s exhaustion of domestic remedies took place when the resolution was notified on May 30, 2011, pursuant to Article 46.1.a of the Convention. Since the petition was filed on November 29, 2011, it meets the requirement established in Article 46.1.b of the Convention. VII. COLORABLE CLAIM 12. In view of the elements of fact and law presented by the parties and the nature of the matter brought to its attention, the Commission believes that, if proved, the alleged facts concerning acts of discrimination against the alleged victim as a result of the expression of his sexual orientation, as well as the 4