Families v. Brazil 9 and Guachalá Chimbo v. Ecuador; 10 as well as in my concurring opinions in the cases of Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador, 11 Poblete Vilches et al. v. Chile 12 and Casa Nina v. Peru 13 in relation to the justiciability of Article 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the American Convention” or “the Convention)”. 2. For this purpose, I will reiterate my position regarding the problems of interpretation and legal basis of the theory of justiciability of Article 26 of the American Convention, in particular, those arising from this judgment due to the lack of differentiation between the obligations of immediate enforceability and those of progressive development. I. THE JUSTICIABILITY OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION: OBLIGATIONS OF IMMEDIATE ENFORCEABILITY AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT 3. In previous separate opinions I have set forth in detail multiple arguments that demonstrate the logical and legal contradictions and inconsistencies in the theory of the direct and autonomous justiciability of economic, social, cultural and environmental rights (hereinafter “ESCER”) through Article 26 of the American Convention. Indeed, the position assumed by the Court since the case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, ignores the wording of the American Convention, a treaty that grants jurisdiction to the Court; it ignores the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; 14 it modifies the nature of the obligation of progressive development enshrined in Article 26; 15 it ignores the will of the States embodied in Article 19 of the Protocol of San Salvador; 16 and it undermines the legitimacy of the Court in the regional sphere, 17 just to mention some arguments. 4. On this occasion, I do not intend to delve into the aforementioned point, but rather to highlight the inaccuracies which, in my opinion, affect the decision in relation to the scope and content of the obligations of immediate enforceability and progressive development, derived from Article 26 of the Convention. As the Court has already established in its case law, the recognition of ESCER generates obligations of a different nature for the States: on the one hand, obligations that are immediately enforceable, by virtue of which effective measures must be implemented to guarantee access without discrimination to the benefits of ESCER and, on the other hand, those of Cf. Case of the Workers of the Fireworks Factory in Santo Antônio of Jesus and their Families v. Brazil. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 15, 2020. Series C No. 407. Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. 9 10 Cf. Case of Guachalá Chimbo et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 26, 2021. Series C No. 423. Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. 11 Cf. Case of Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 1, 2015. Series C No. 298. Concurring Opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. 12 Cf. Case of Poblete Vilches et al. v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 8, 2018. Series C No. 349. Concurring Opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. 13 Cf. Case of Casa Nina v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 24, 2020. Series C No. 419. Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. 14 Cf. Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 6, 2019. Series C No. 375. 15 Cf. Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2018. Series C No. 359. 16 349. Cf. Case of Poblete Vilches et al. v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 8, 2018. Series C No. 17 Cf. Case of the Dismissed Employees of Petroperú et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2017. Series C No. 344.