practice protected the right to job stability, and with it, the social security component." Accordingly, he argued that in the instant case, the harm caused by the wrongful acts committed by the State—resulting in the victim’s loss of his employment—"must be redressed with the wages and social benefits lost" by the victim, including "[the] social benefits with a view to future retirement, not just [...] the wages lost". 13. He asked "because it is not clear in the judgment what the practical effects of finding a violation of the victim’s right to job stability are for him” if the Court would clarify whether its judgment “means that the victim has the right to social benefits with a view to future retirement” and, if so, whether “the order to grant the contributions corresponding to social security payments for the purposes of a future retirement and unemployment should be issued by the [...] Court [...] or [whether] the victim should approach domestic courts” for such an order. 14. The State argued that the wording of paragraph 160 of the judgment—where the Court sets the loss-of-earnings amount to be paid to the victim—is clear and unambiguous, and its content is relevant, congruent, and precise with respect to the full text of the judgment. It indicated that the representative “asks in error" that the Court establish social benefits with a view to a future retirement in favor of the victim, as this constitutes a matter of the merits that neither can nor should be analyzed through a request for interpretation. It added that the representative’s intent is to “confuse” the Court into amending the judgment, thereby “obtaining additional compensation.” It asked that the request for interpretation be dismissed on the grounds that it is inadmissible. 15. The Commission indicated that, in its jurisprudence regarding arbitrary dismissals or dismissals from public office, the Court has ruled to recognize victims’ lost wages and corresponding social retirement benefits, requiring the State make the respective social benefit payments so they will have access to social security. It added that "it would be pertinent" for the Court to clarify whether the reparations set forth in paragraphs 145 and 160 of the judgment, arise from the obligation to recognize the benefits the victim would have received had he not been arbitrarily dismissed—that is, dismissed in violation of articles 23(1)(c) and 26 of the Convention. A.2. Considerations of the Court 16. The Court recalls that paragraph 160 of the judgment stated as follows: Therefore, because the procedure culminating in the victim’s dismissal was found to be in violation of his rights, the Court sets, in equity, for loss of earnings for the period from October 25, 2000—the date on which the Disciplinary Court imposed the above-mentioned sanction—to the date of issue of this judgment, the amount of USD 75,000.00 (seventy-five thousand United States dollars). 7 17. The representative has requested clarification as to whether the judgment establishes the "right to social benefits with a view to future retirement" for the victim, and, if so, whether it should be ordered by this Court or the victim should seek to claim it before domestic courts. 18. In response to the request presented, the Court recalls that in the judgment, compensation was awarded to the victim in view of the fact that it was impossible to reinstate him to the position he had held (para. 145). In addition, compensation was ordered for material damages for loss of income or loss of earnings. Based on this, the amounts set for 7 In paragraph 145 of the judgment, cited by the Commission, the Court ruled that, since it was not feasible to grant the victim's request for reinstatement to the position he had held, the State must pay him compensation in the amount of USD 30,000.00 (thirty thousand United States dollars). 4