Bucaram.” 29 34. The judgment in the Quinta Coello et al. case, which took place in the same context as the instant case, said, “the resolution by means of which the judges were dismissed was the result of a political alliance that was intended to create a Supreme Court sympathetic to the political majority existing at that time and to impede criminal proceedings against the acting president and a former president.” 30 This was the decisive argument that led the Inter-American Court to conclude in the case that “abuse of power” was present as one of the features of the violation against the institutional dimension of judicial independence. 35. The State itself, in the case of Quintana Coello et al., admitted to violation of Article 9 of the American Convention, noting that the action by the National Congress “could have been understood as an ad-hoc proceeding of a punitive nature.” 31 36. We therefore believe that the Court should have ruled on the matter as argued and expressly pled by the Inter-American Commission and the representatives of the victim regarding violation of Article 9 of the Convention, given the seriousness of the facts and considering the true motivations that led to the dismissal of the members of Ecuador’s high courts at the time. It is worth noting that the judgment itself points to “an abrupt, totally unacceptable course of action” by the National Congress, and that in view of the facts, “a mass, arbitrary dismissal of judges is unacceptable given its negative impact on the institutional dimension of judicial independence.” 32 37. If indeed the point of departure for the dismissal proceedings was materially punitive, the judgment should have held that Resolution 25-160 defined no grounds for removal from office of the TSE members, but that in fact they were dismissed because their appointment two years prior had allegedly been illegal. The 1998 Constitution empowered the National Congress to remove TSE members from office by means of impeachment proceedings, or via prosecution, but not for having been appointed illegally. This meant that they were removed on grounds and through proceedings different from those set by law, and this should have been examined in light of the principle of freedom from ex post facto laws. 38. Article 9 of the American Convention states, “[n]o one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense under the applicable law,” and, “[a] heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed.” The Court has interpreted that these mandates apply not only in criminal proceedings, but that their scope also includes administrative sanctions. 33 This standard can extend by analogy to de facto punitive proceedings such as the one conducted against Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. 29 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 84; Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador, para. 174, and Case of the Constitutional Court (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, para. 211. 30 Cf. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador, para. 177. 31 Cf. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador, supra, para. 13. 32 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 85. Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, supra, para. 106, and Case of Urrutia Laubreaux v. Chile. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 27, 2020. Series C No. 409, para. 129. 33 10