6. The punitive nature of the dismissal can be seen clearly from the facts and context of the case, because the massive layoff of judges from the three highest courts was motivated by the “political accords” between then-President Lucio Gutiérrez (against whom the opposition parties were preparing an impeachment trial for the crime of embezzlement) and the parliamentary majority of the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party, led by former President Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz. All this clearly reveals, in the words of the judgment, “the interest in putting a stop to criminal proceedings being conducted by the Supreme Court against former President Bucaram.” 7 It is very clear what truly led to the dismissal of the judges from the three high courts and the (nearly immediate) appointment of other judges for the purpose of institutional appropriation of the top echelons of the judiciary. 7. We found it fitting, in view of these considerations and in the terms of Article 66(2) of the American Convention, 8 to attach this concurring opinion to the judgment, and thus emphasize certain matters concerning the essentially democratic dimension of judicial independence, which are particularly significant in the case of a board of elections, and express our respectful disagreement with the majority for its decision not to undertake an analysis of the arguments by the Inter-American Commission and the representatives of the victim on violation of the principle of freedom from ex post facto laws contained in Article 9 of the Convention. 8. Along these lines and in the interest of greater clarity, this opinion will (II) explain the context in which the facts of the case unfolded; this approach is necessary to understand the legal consequences of the State’s acts and omissions that infringed Carlos Julio Aguinaga Aillón’s rights as a member of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (paras. 9 to 13); (III) focus on the key points of the the Court’s opinions regarding judicial independence, which are especially relevant to the case of an electoral court because of their intrinsic connection with the democratic system and the exercise of political rights (paras. 14 to 20); (IV) discuss why this case is particularly important and novel in its approach to violation of the right to work in cases of the arbitrary dismissal of judges (paras. 21 to 25); (V) express our respectful dissent with the decision not to analyze violation of the principle of freedom from ex post facto laws, explicitly raised and requested by the Inter-American Commission and the representatives of the victim (paras. 26 to 41); and finally, (VI) give a brief conclusion to the views expressed herein (paras. 42 to 46). II. CONTEXT 9. The circumstances behind the facts need to be discussed to facilitate a full understanding of the human rights violations in the instant case. 10. The facts of the specific case, that is, the dismissal of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón from his position on the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter “TSE”) occurred as part of the removal of the members of the high courts of Ecuador in 2004, in a setting of overt political instability. This context, already discussed by the Court in the cases of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador and the Constitutional Court (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, was reiterated in the instant 7 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, paras. 37 and 84. Article 66(2) of the Convention reads: “[i]f the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to have his dissenting or separate opinion attached to the judgment.” Also, see Articles 24(3) of the Statute and Articles 32(1)(a), 65(2) and 67(4) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 8 3