CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES DIEGO GARCÍA-SAYÁN, LEONARDO A. FRANCO, MANUEL VENTURA ROBLES, MARGARETTE MAY MACAULAY AND RHADYS ABREU BLONDET PROVISIONAL MEASURES REGARDING COLOMBIA CASE OF GUTIÉRREZ SOLER 1. The authority to order provisional measures "to prevent irreparable damage to persons" in cases of "extreme seriousness and urgency" is one of the core competencies of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter "the Inter-American Court," "the Court" or "the Tribunal"). As set forth in Article 63(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter "the American Convention" or "the Convention") and, based on said provision and through its constant jurisprudence, the Court has issued provisional measures ever since the beginning of its jurisdictional activities, and it has had a significant impact on human rights protection. At present, this is one of the principal activities of the Court, which is exercised and implemented by the Court in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Article 63(2), the whole of the Convention and the norms and principles of international law. The constant exercise of this jurisprudence by the Court has made it possible "to avoid irreparable damage" to thousands of people whose lives or physical integrity were in danger. 2. The Convention stipulates that the Court may order provisional measures "in matters brought before [the Court]." The constant jurisprudence of the Court, and the subsequent internal rules of the Court, have interpreted this provision in the sense that it may order such measures "at any stage of proceedings," which has included, and includes, the monitoring compliance with judgment phase of a contentious case. This jurisdiction has never been questioned by a State, let alone by a Judge of the Court. Although the right of a judge to think and vote differently to other judges is incontrovertible —as is the presentation of a dissenting opinion—, questioning the competence of the Court not only lacks any sort of merit and precedent in this case, but it is also very serious since it affects and weakens the Tribunal. And it does so in a highly sensitive area, such as that concerning, none other than, "irreparable damages," which many people could suffer if it were not for the provisional measures ordered by the Court in exercising its jurisdictional powers. In this case, moreover, it cannot be overlooked that the Judge who presents the dissenting opinion has voted in favor of no less than five orders for provisional measures in the monitoring compliance with the judgment phase. In all of these orders, the maintenance of the provisional measures was requested for all or some of the beneficiaries. 3. This concurring opinion strives to reaffirm, in general, the competence of the interAmerican Court Human Rights in relation to provisional measures, and in particular those which the Court orders, and can order, during the course of proceedings for contentious cases —including the monitoring compliance with judgments phase. All of the above is perfectly coherent with the American Convention on Human Rights, and the norms and principles of international law that have supported the constant jurisprudence and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in this area. 4. This opinion is divided into four parts: it begins with a brief analysis of the competencies of the European Human Rights Court in relation to provisional measures; followed by an analysis of the competencies of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1

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