and indivisible and, therefore, as in this case, civil and political rights are interwoven with economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, and cannot be separated. 4. Consequently, I have asserted that this interdependence and indivisibility allows the human being to be seen integrally, as fully entitled to all rights, and this has an impact on the justiciability of his rights. A similar vision is set forth in the Preamble to the Protocol of San Salvador: “Considering the close relationship that exists between economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights, in that the different categories of rights constitute an indivisible whole based on the recognition of the dignity of the human person, for which reason both require permanent protection and promotion if they are to be fully realized, and the violation of some rights in favor of the realization of others can never be justified.” 5. From this perspective, Article 26 of the Convention acts as a framework article, in the understanding that it makes a general allusion to the economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, for the description and determination of which, it refers us to the OAS Charter. The Protocol of San Salvador individualizes and provides content to the economic, social, cultural and environmental rights. This Protocol underlines the importance that these (rights) be reaffirmed, developed, perfected and protected (see Preamble). Lastly, a series of instruments exist in the inter-American corpus juris that also refer to the ESCER. 6. Thus, I consider that this judgment reveals the coexistence of several rights of the victims that are indivisible and justiciable before the Court per se as explained in paragraphs 180 and ff. of the judgment. Consequently, Article 19(6) of the Protocol of San Salvador does not constitute an impediment of any kind for the Court to consider their joint violation in this case. 7. As indicated in the third, fourth and fifth operative paragraphs, it is declared that the rights to life, personal integrity, privacy, equality before the law, and health were violated in this case pursuant to Articles 4, 5, 7(1), 7(3), 8(2), 8(1), 8(2), 8(2)(d), 8(2)(e), 11 and 24 of the Convention, in relation to the obligations to respect and ensure rights, and the duty to adopt domestic legal provisions contained in Articles 1(1) and 2 of this instrument. Therefore, I understand that based on the concept that I have maintained regarding the interpretation and application of the American Convention, the right to health is justiciable owing to the coexistence of the violation of several Convention-based rights, without any need to resort to justifications based on the autonomous citing of Article 26 of the Convention. III. THE INTERSECTIONALITY AND STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION THAT MANUELA WAS A VICTIM OF PLACED HER IN A SITUATION OF SPECIAL VULNERABILITY 8. Paragraph 253 of the judgment indicates that "various structural disadvantages coalesced in Manuela and had an impact on her victimization. In particular, the Court underscores that Manuela was a poor illiterate woman who lived in a rural area. If the discrimination that has been alleged in this case is verified, these factors of vulnerability or sources of discrimination would have coalesced intersectionally, increasing the presumed victim’s comparative disadvantages and causing a specific form of discrimination due to the confluence of all those factors." Added to this, in the same paragraph, the Court considers that “those factors of discrimination coincide with the profile of most of the women who have been tried for abortion or aggravated homicide in El Salvador; they have little or no income, hardly any schooling, and reside in rural or marginal urban areas." Consequently, in this section, I will analyze the importance of taking into account the intersectionality of vulnerabilities and structural discrimination that prejudiced Manuela. 2