A.1 Arguments of the parties and the Commission 17. The State indicated that “the sentence became final on August 26, 2008, and was in effect until her death on April 30, 2010. However, the petition was not lodged before the Commission […] until March 21, 2012, almost four years after the sentence had become final and almost two years after Manuela’s death.” The State emphasized that the Commission had considered that, in the instant case, the petition had been lodged within a reasonable time, but had “failed to provide the grounds or the reasons for its decision.” 18. The representatives argued that it was contradictory to argue the failure to exhaust domestic remedies before the Commission and, then, allege failure to comply with the time limit of six months to lodge a petition, because this contravened the principle of estoppel. Added to this, in the case of Manuela “the petition was lodged within the six-month time frame established in Article 46(1)(b) of the [Convention], of the notification of the ruling that dismissed the appeal for review of the sentence in 2012. Furthermore, claiming that Manuela should have presented the petition less than 6 months after the final criminal conviction would be contrary to the interests of justice and would have constituted a disproportionate burden on the [presumed] victim.” 19. The Commission indicated that the objection was time-barred because it should have been filed during the initial stages of the admissibility procedure before the Commission. The Commission also underlined that, when applying Article 46(2)(b)) of the American Convention and determining that the petition had been lodged within a reasonable time, it took into account that: “(1) the petition was lodged on March 21, 2012; (2) regarding the facts, it is on record that these occurred on February 27, 2008, and that the victim was convicted to 30 years’ imprisonment for the offense of aggravated homicide on August 11, 2008; (3) no ordinary remedy existed that would have permitted contesting the sentence pursuant to Article 8(2)(h). In addition, the victim was unable to benefit from the special remedy of cassation that was available because her defense counsel failed to file this remedy or to advise her or her family that this rather limited remedy existed to contest her sentence, and (4) the [presumed] victim died on April 30, 2010, after suffering from Hodgkin’s lymphoma in a context in which a series of violations of her right to health were alleged while she was deprived of liberty, and there was a total failure to clarify her death while in State custody.” A.2 Considerations of the Court 20. The Court has indicated that the conditions for the admissibility of petition (Articles 44 to 46 of the American Convention) constitute a guarantee to ensure that the parties are able to exercise their right to defense during the proceedings,69 and are of a preclusive nature in cases in which the Commission processes the admissibility and the merits of a case separately.70 Thus, an objection concerning the alleged failure to comply with the time limit for lodging the petition must be presented explicitly at the admissibility stage of the case. 71 21. In the instant case, the State’s arguments concerning the time-barred nature of the petition were not presented at the appropriate procedural moment; that is, at the admissibility stage of the case. In fact, the Court notes that the State first mentioned the alleged timebarred presentation of the petition in a communication sent to the Inter-American Commission Cf. Case of Grande v. Argentina. Preliminary objections and merits. Judgment of August 31, 2011. Series C No. 231, para. 56, and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 25, 2018. Series C No. 354, para. 124. 69 70 Cf. Case of Grande v. Argentina, supra, para. 56, and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 124. 71 Mutatis mutandis, Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 124. 12