as already indicated, a punishment that is evidently disproportionate is contrary to Article 5(2) and 5(6) of the Convention.279 166. In this regard, it should be pointed out, first, that the application of the punishment established for the criminal offense of aggravated homicide was clearly disproportionate in this case because it does not take into account the particular situation of women during the perinatal and postpartum stages;280 notwithstanding the fact that, owing to a deficient investigation, it should not be ruled out that, in this case, there was an absence of any criminal responsibility. 167. To this should be added that criminological experience in relation to infanticide reveals, first, that it usually occurs in solitary, unassisted deliveries and often in toilets,281 which means when a woman’s mental fragility is most acute. In this regard, specialized legal doctrine has rightly pointed out that “the feeling of despair is accentuated in the young mother who gives birth secretly, without help.”282 168. In addition to the abysmal disproportion in relation to the guilt resulting merely from the state that a woman finds herself in during the perinatal period, it should not be forgotten that, in most cases – and also in that of Manuela – their guilt should also be lessened because they are young women who find it difficult to communicate or who are experiencing cultural isolation (in cities, this is frequent among urban domestic employees who are originally from poor campesino families). Furthermore, many are illiterate or with little schooling. They come from family circles located in social enclaves with a backward culture that is considerably more patriarchal than the rest of society. Owing to all these negative factors, these are women who are not in a situation to join or achieve the protection of the movements that habitually struggle to achieve women’s rights and equality; they are truly highly vulnerable women without a voice, driven to commit this offense due to backward enclaves with a strongly patriarchal culture. 169. Although, in Manuela’s case, the criminal court took these factors into account when deciding her sentence, it is paradoxical that, after highlighting those misogynistic values, the judgment concluded that there were attenuating factors and, on that basis, decided to impose no less than thirty years’ imprisonment. Moreover, it is evident that, in this case, this punishment was clearly cruel. 170. Based on the above, and pursuant to Article 5(2) and 5(6) of the American Convention, the Court considers that the sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment for a homicide committed by a mother during the perinatal period was disproportionate to her level of individualized blame (or guilt). Therefore, the current punishment established for infanticide is cruel and, consequently, contrary to the Convention. See, for example, Case of Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, para. 150, and Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 166. 279 Almost all contemporary literature on legal medicine agrees with this. Cf. C. Simonin, Medicina Legal Judicial, Barcelona, 1973, p. 273; a review of current medical bibliography in Mariano N. Castex, Estado puerperal e infanticidio, Implicancias médico-legales y psiquiátrico-forenses, Buenos Aires, 2008. Similarly, Case of I.V. v. Bolivia, supra, para. 231. Castex proposes that the period which begins for every mother at the moment the fetus become viable and concludes with the reappearance of menstruation should be referred to as the perinatal period. Mariano N. Castex, Estado puerperal e infanticidio, Implicancias médico-legales y psiquiátrico-forenses, Buenos Aires, 2008, p. 73. 280 This has been recorded for many years, for example: Ambrosio Tardieu, Estudio médico-legal sobre el infanticidio, translated by Prudencio Sereñana y Partagás, Barcelona, 1883, pp. 253 and ff. 281 282 Cf. C. Simonin, Medicina Legal Judicial, Barcelona, 1973, p. 273, 49