SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE EDUARDO VIO GROSSI INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE OF WONG HO WING v. PERU JUDGMENT OF JUNE 30, 2015 (Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs) INTRODUCTION This dissenting opinion1 to the Judgment indicated above2 is issued because the Judgment rejected the preliminary objection concerning failure to comply with the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies filed by the Republic of Peru. 3 The grounds for this dissent relate to the moment at which this rule should be complied with. The Judgment takes the view that this should be, at the latest, when the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights4 takes a decision on the admissibility of the petition or communication5 that has given rise to the corresponding case; 6 to the contrary, in this opinion, I maintain that this rule should be complied with at the time the petition is lodged, and this should be verified by the Commission both when this occurs and when deciding on the petition’s admissibility. In other words, while the Judgment considers that compliance with this rule is a requirement for the admissibility of the petition, in this opinion, I consider that compliance with the rule is a requirement for its presentation and, consequently, to enable it to be processed. Bearing in mind the provisions of Article 65(2) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, this opinion refers only and exclusively to the reasons why the undersigned considers that the Judgment should have admitted the preliminary objection concerning the lack of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies filed by the State and, consequently, must refrain from commenting on the merits of the case. Therefore, this opinions is limited to the operative paragraph on this point adopted in the Judgment. Nevertheless, I wish to record that the undersigned, as in other cases, 7 has participated in both the deliberation and the voting by the Court with regard to each operative 1 Article 66(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “the Convention”): “[i]f the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to have his dissenting or separate opinion attached to the judgment.” Article 24(3) of the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court”): “[t]he decisions, judgments and opinions of the Court shall be delivered in public session, and the parties shall be given written notification thereof. In addition, the decisions, judgments and opinions shall be published, along with judges' individual votes and opinions and with such other data or background information that the Court may deem appropriate.” Article 65(2) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure: “[a]ny judge who has taken part in the consideration of a case is entitled to append a separate concurring or dissenting opinion to the judgment. These opinions shall be submitted within a time frame to be established by the President so that the other judges may take cognizance thereof before notice of the judgment is served. The opinions shall only refer to the issues covered in the judgment.” 2 Hereinafter “the Judgment,” 3 Hereinafter “the State.” 4 Hereinafter “the Commission.” 5 Hereinafter “the petition.” 6 Cf. para. 26 of the Judgment. 7 Dissenting opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, Case of Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 17, 2015. Series C No. 292, and Dissenting