8. It is for this reason that I have stated that the interdependence and indivisibility enables viewing the individual integrally as a full holder of rights, which has an impact on the justiciability of his or her rights. The American Declaration on Human Rights recognizes civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights. This is reaffirmed in the Preamble of the American Convention: “Reiterating that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free men enjoying freedom from fear and want can be achieved only if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights…”. The next paragraph mandated the drafting of a convention on ESCER. In turn, the Preamble to the Protocol of San Salvador states: “Considering the close relationship that exists between economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights, in that the different categories of rights constitute an indivisible whole based on the recognition of the dignity of the human person, for which reason both require permanent protection and promotion if they are to be fully realized, and the violation of some rights in favor of the realization of others can never be justified.” 9. According to this perspective, Article 26 of the Convention functions as a framework article in that it refers in general terms to economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, the reading and the determination of which remits us to the OAS Charter. The Protocol of San Salvador, in turn, individualizes and gives content to those rights. I underline that, in view of the great importance of these rights, the Protocol states that they should be reaffirmed, developed, perfected and protected (see Preamble). Finally, there is a group of instruments of the inter-American corpus juris that also refer to ESCER. 10. Thus, as a framework article, Article 26 of the Convention enables a greater and more coherent confluence with the other articles of the Convention when determining the meaning and scope of the violations. This interpretation transcends the artificial division between rights of different categories with different degrees of effectiveness that in the case of ESCER denies access to inter-American justice for their safeguarding. This is especially so when the Court intervenes in cases involving the most unequal zone of the planet. In reaffirming the perspective of simultaneity, we seek to ignore the reductionisms that might denote the aforementioned two perspectives. On the one hand, a perspective that eliminates the possibility of declaring an infringement of Article 26, which ultimately completely invisibilizes the autonomy and existence of ESCER as truly justiciable rights and, therefore, in force. On the other hand, a perspective that considers Article 26 as the only instrument of application when dealing with ESCER, which would ignore the interdependence and interrelationship with civil and political rights. 11. This case perfectly demonstrates the necessity of a coherent and congruent protection not only within the scope of ESCER, but also from a broad analysis of violations in simultaneity with civil and political rights. I repeat that, in no case, may human rights be treated in an isolated manner and without considering them as a whole, because the complex reality requires an analysis that privileges the interdependence and inter-relationship among them. This case exemplifies that confluence since the Court finds that the 184 persons were victims of the violation of their right to be heard with due guarantees and within a reasonable period, by competent judges or courts, as required by Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention, read in conjunction with the obligation to respect and ensure the rights contained in Article 1(1) thereof. It must be underscored that, therefore, the guarantees of due process, access to justice and political rights regarding dismissals from employment and the violation of the right to work, especially with regard to the right to work stability, must be treated jointly. We thus need a full analysis in the light of those rights that comprise, as one of the components, the right to work stability and the right to protection from dismissal without the possibility of an effective appeal. In contrast, to approach the analysis only from the civil and political rights involved would be limiting, as it would also be to focus only on the issue of work. 3