5 claims that Melba del Carmen Suárez Peralta has required several surgeries as a result of the medical malpractice and that she is in a state of extreme vulnerability that prevents her from carrying out any normal form of work, which in turn affects her economic situation. He contends that in her condition, she has no access to appropriate medical treatment and that the State – in spite of the commitment to provide free medical care assumed at the working meeting during the IACHR’s 137th period of sessions – has taken no steps toward providing her with such services. 23. To summarize: the petitioner contends that the State’s international responsibility was triggered by its failure to observe the positive obligation of adopting the necessary measures to ensure the effective protection of the victim’s human rights and that the State did violate Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, in conjunction with Article 1.1 thereof. He requests that the Commission rule the State responsible; require the State to pay fair compensation to Melba del Carmen Suárez Peralta and her family, including consequential damages and future losses; and to order the commencement of the corresponding legal actions against the perpetrators, accomplices and accessories after the fact responsible for violating the rights enshrined in the Convention. B. State 24. The State contends that the guarantee of reasonable time was observed and that the victims did not pursue the available remedies. It also holds that Ecuadorian law offered Melba Peralta Mendoza, the victim’s mother, actions for speeding up the proceedings and satisfying her claims, which were not invoked at the appropriate time. It therefore maintains that it did not violate the rights alleged by the petitioner and asks the Commission to issue a ruling establishing that. 25. Regarding Article 25.1 of the Convention, the State claims that amparo is a simple remedy in which the judge hears a case, issues his orders, and respects the right of defense, and in 8 which “the actions of the applicant have to be conducted under his own responsibility and interest.” It holds that the right of effective protection, according to the Inter-American Court, requires judges to conduct proceedings in such a way as to avoid the probability of undue hindrance, but that consideration does not preclude the responsibility of the victim in seeking to satisfy his claims. 26. It maintains that the alleged victims’ representative was in a position to pursue the actions offered by law, and could even have lodged a personal accusation to become a party to the proceedings and, later, to demand the relevant compensation. It holds that the State has no obligation to ensure that proceedings produce results that are favorable to the applicants, particularly if they do not meet the legal requirements set for their filing, as was the case with the amparo actions brought by the 9 petitioner, as indicated by the decisions handed down by the judges who heard those applications. 27. The State claims that Melba Peralta Mendoza could have filed for recusal or lodged an appeal remedy. It notes that recusal is a request for a judge to be replaced when he has incurred in a 10 cause for separation from the proceedings and has not separated himself of his own volition. It explains that the remedy was established as one of the means for ensuring that judges act with impartiality and justice, rectitude and integrity, equality and objectivity. It states that this action is an effective way of speeding up proceedings when they have been halted by the justice administration. It contends that in the case at hand, the victim’s mother could have invoked that remedy if she felt she was affected by the delay in the proceedings, and that it could have led to a transfer of competence and sped up the process. 28. It further holds that Melba Peralta Mendoza could have lodged an appeal against the triggering of statutory limitations, and that such appeals are admissible against decisions to cancel or 8 Office of the Attorney General of the State, document received on August 20, 2009. 9 The Commission has no copies or more specific references to those amparo actions. 10 Ecuador indicates that this remedy is provided for in Art. 856 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Art. 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) of 2000. Office of the Attorney General of the State, document received on August 20, 2009.