79. The State argued that “the alleged vagueness of the concept of improper performance does not result in its being an unknown quantity,” because “case law and legal doctrine have established a well-trodden path […] of which the community, and obviously the petitioners owing to their profession, are aware.” A.8. Protection of honor and dignity 80. The representatives argued that the impeachment proceedings created a negative image of the presumed victims in both judicial and social circles, and accusations against them were even published in the media. They pointed out that the fact that the charges had been forwarded to the criminal jurisdiction had resulted in “a long and distressing investigation.” All of this had caused severe suffering at a personal and family level. 81. The State argued that the facts on which the alleged violation was based had been rejected by the Commission at the admissibility stage. In addition, those facts were not examined at the merits stage of the procedure before the Commission. It asked the Court to “reject the arguments relating” to the said violations. The Commission did not rule in this regard. A.9. Right to equal protection of the law 82. The representatives argued that the State had discriminated against the presumed victims, “for political reasons,” on two occasions: (a) when removing a group of justices from their functions based on judgments that had also been signed by other justices who had not been subject to impeachment, and (b) by preventing them – by Resolution No. 122 – from appealing the decision taken in the impeachment proceedings, “which was a right of everyone else in the State’s territory.” 83. The State argued that, in its Merits Report, the Commission had not considered the facts relating to the violation of Article 24 of the Convention and, therefore, they should be rejected. The Commission did not rule in this regard. B. Considerations of the Court 84. The Court will now include some general considerations on judicial independence and the specific safeguards that are required by this principle in relation to the function of judges, and will then examine this specific case. B.1. The guarantee of irremovability of judicial authorities and the guarantee against external pressures 85. On several occasions, this Court has had occasion to rule on the relevance of judicial independence under the rule of law.76 In its consistent case law, the Court has indicated that Cf. Inter alia, Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No., paras. 73 to 75; Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, paras. 145 and 156; Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, paras. 43 to 45, 84 and 138; Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, paras. 67, 68 and 70 to 81; Case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2011. Series C No. 227, paras. 97 to 100; Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 186; Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2013. Series C No. 266, paras. 144 to 154; Case of 76 21