entail an arbitrary infringement of the function of the judicial authorities.105 98. Consistent with this, even though impeachment proceedings take place within political organs when they are instituted against judicial authorities, the control that such organs exercise, rather than being based on reasons of political pertinence, opportunity or convenience, must be subject to legal criteria in the sense that the proceedings and the final decision should relate to whether or not the charges have been proved, and whether or not the conduct meets the criteria on which the indictment was based, all while observing the guarantees of due process. This does not signify denaturing or altering the essence of the control that has been democratically entrusted to an organ such as the Legislature; rather it seeks to ensure that this control, when applied to judges, reinforces the system of separation of powers and constitutes an adequate mechanism for accountability without undermining judicial independence.106 99. Second, it should be recalled that in both the case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru and the case of the Constitution Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, this Court indicated that, pursuant to the domestic law in force in each case, the Legislature was prohibited from conducting the respective impeachment proceedings and, consequently, from removing the defendants on the basis of issues relating to the exercise of the jurisdictional function. In this context, in both cases the Court affirmed that the organ in charge of the impeachment proceedings – the Congress of the Republic of Peru and the National Congress of Ecuador, respectively – were prohibited from examining jurisdictional acts, and concluded that the opinions pronounced in the judgments of the judicial authorities could not be used as a reason to remove them.107 Moreover, in the latter case, the Legislature’s action was described as “clear evidence of the undermining of judicial independence.”108 100. Based on the above precedents, it is essential to determine whether the said standard for cases of impeachment proceedings instituted against judicial authorities could constitute a parameter that limits the discretionality of the organs in charge of the procedure in order to safeguard judicial independence. 101. In this regard, it should be noted that several international instruments explicitly recognize the prohibition to subject the judicial decisions of the courts to review – other than by the procedural mechanism of appeal – as a specific mechanism for the protection of judicial independence. This is indicated, for example, in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,109 and the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial In this regard, in 2006, the Human Rights Committee expressed its concern to the Paraguayan State owing to “the lack of objective criteria governing the […] removal of judges, including Supreme Court justices,” a situation which could, in the Committee’s opinion, “undermine the independence of the judiciary.” Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Paraguay, April 24, 2006, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PRY/CO/2, para. 17. 106 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers at the time indicated that in view of the “tensions” that exist between judicial independence and the accountability of judges, the latter concept “must be in line with international standards of due process and fair trial.” Cf. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/32, April 28, 2014, paras. 51 and 106. 107 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, supra, paras. 76, 80 and 82, and Case of the Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, supra, paras. 204 and 206. 108 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos et al.) v. Ecuador, supra, para. 206. 109 Cf. United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 1985 and 40/146 of December 13, 1985, Principle 4: “[t]here shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial 105 27