B. Right to nationality, due process and the principle of legality B.1. Arguments of the parties and observations of the Commission 86. The Commission pointed out that nationality is the legal expression of the social fact of an individual’s connection with the State, from which political and certain civil rights are derived. It also observed that States have the discretionary authority to establish the conditions that people who wish to obtain another nationality must meet. However, it noted that States may not act arbitrarily in the exercise of their discretionary authority, and so are limited by the duty to provide equal and effective protection under the law, without discrimination, and the duty to prevent, avoid and reduce statelessness. In the instant case, the Commission maintained that the Acting Federal Judge studied the documentation of the criminal proceedings to ascertain the situation. Although no final judgment had been delivered, and based on the information available, he concluded that Ms. Habbal had acted fraudulently and therefore stripped her of her nationality. According to the Commission, the Federal Judge’s actions constituted a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence. The Commission furthermore concluded that the decision of the Acting Federal Judge and the Appeals Court showed disregard for the principle of legality, and the obligation to provide sufficient grounds for its decision. 87. In addition, the Commission emphasized that the procedure followed in revoking Ms. Habbal’s nationality should have provided her with procedural guarantees, since there was a possibility that she could be stripped of her nationality. Regarding the reasons for the decision, the Commission argued that the judicial decision revoking Ms. Habbal’s nationality did not contain a proportionality analysis taking into account the legitimate purpose and the violation of rights. It observed that the authorities never took into consideration the fact that Raghda Habbal was the mother of a child born in Argentina. The Commission also maintained that the State failed to consider the risk of Ms. Habbal being rendered stateless if her citizenship was revoked, in violation of the duty to prevent statelessness. For all these reasons, the Commission concluded that the Argentine State had violated the principle of presumption of innocence, the principle of legality and the right to nationality, established in Articles 8(2), 9, and 20 of the American Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Raghda Habbal. 88. The representatives argued that the State had violated the rights protected by Articles 8, 20 and 9 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1(1) thereof, due to the violation of the principle of presumption of innocence. They asserted that the judge had revoked Raghda Habbal’s citizenship without waiting for the outcome of the criminal proceedings, thus violating the principle of innocence. The representatives also argued that the right to nationality and the prevention of statelessness had been violated because Ms. Habbal had been forced to renounce her Syrian nationality in order to adopt Argentine citizenship, and so was rendered stateless when the Judiciary revoked her Argentine nationality. The representatives maintained that the civil courts involved had said nothing on the matter. Likewise, they argued that Resolution 1088 had violated Ms. Habbal’s rights because it failed to take into account the possibility of her being rendered stateless. They argued that this administrative act was extremely onerous for the alleged victims, as it did not allow them to exercise the right of defense, and failed to provide an exhaustive analysis of the grounds for the decision and thus demonstrate its proportionality. 89. The State contended that the Commission’s conclusion that the principles of legality and presumption of innocence, as well as the obligation to provide sufficient grounds, had 29