with the parameters that emanate from binding norms of international law which States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, have undertaken to abide by. 118 92. Thus, in accordance with the current trend in international human rights law, the Court has held that, when regulating the granting of nationality, States must take into account: (a) their obligation to prevent, to avoid and to reduce statelessness, and (b) their obligation to provide each individual with the equal and effective protection of the law without discrimination. 119 Regarding their duty to prevent, avoid, and reduce statelessness, the Court has established that States have the obligation not to adopt practices or laws concerning the granting of nationality, the application of which fosters an increase in the number of stateless persons. This condition arises from the lack of a nationality, when an individual does not qualify to receive this under the State’s laws, owing to arbitrary deprivation or the granting of a nationality that, in actual fact, is not effective. Statelessness deprives an individual of the possibility of enjoying civil and political rights and places him in a condition of extreme vulnerability. 120 Thus, the Court has stipulated that Article 20(2) of the American Convention indicates that “every person has the right to the nationality of the State in whose territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other nationality.” This principle must be interpreted in light of the obligation to ensure the exercise of the rights to all persons subject to the State’s jurisdiction, established in Article 1(1) of the Convention. 121 93. This Court holds that these obligations are applicable with regard not only to the granting of nationality, but also, where pertinent, to the deprivation of nationality. The right to nationality includes the State’s obligation to provide persons with minimum legal protection from the deprivation of nationality. Article 20(3) of the Convention states that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it.” From this it follows that although States may establish the guidelines for regulating the right to nationality pursuant to their domestic law, any proceedings related to the deprivation of nationality must be compatible with the human rights recognized in the American Convention. Therefore, any person against whom deprivation of nationality proceedings are instituted must be guaranteed due process in order to avoid arbitrariness and ensure that the persons concerned are in a position to defend their rights. Likewise, States must comply with the principle of legality. All this means that proceedings for the deprivation of nationality must be carried out according to Articles 8(1), 8(2) and 9 of the American Convention. 94. In relation to the obligations arising from Article 8(1) of the Convention, and as has already been pointed out (supra, para. 68), this Court has stipulated that the duty to state the reasons for a decision is one of the due guarantees included in that article to safeguard the right to due process. The duty to state grounds is a guarantee linked to the proper administration of justice, which protects the right of citizens to be tried for the reasons provided by law, while giving credibility to the legal decisions adopted in a democratic society. 122 By virtue of this, the decisions adopted by national bodies that could affect human rights must be Cf. Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 140, and Case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 256. 118 Cf. Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 140, and Case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 256. 119 120 Cf. Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 142. 121 Cf. Case of expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 259. Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Litigation”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 77, and Case of Pávez Pávez v. Chile, supra, para. 152. 122 31